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CHAPTER 4 
Domestic Relations 
SURVEY Stafft 
§ 4.1. The Adverse Inference from Failure to Testify in Child Custody 
Cases.* Massachusetts law provides that any person with information 
that parents are not providing proper care for their child may petition a 
district court for a hearing to determine whether the child should be 
removed from the parents' home and committed to the custody of a 
public agency.' The Massachusetts courts steadily adhere to the view, 
which is virtually unanimous among the states, that the procedural rights 
of parents in such a hearing, while greater than those of the typical civil 
litigant,2 are less than those of a criminal defendant. 3 
One procedural protection provided to a criminal defendant is the fifth 
t Alan J. Applebaum, Carole A. Casey, Mary V. Deck, Christopher D. Dillon, Mark D. 
Lurie, William T. Matlack, Diane L. Saltoun, Lisa K. Snow. 
* Alap J. Applebaum, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.1. 1 G.L. c. ll9, § 24 (West 1969). Section 24 provides: 
/d. 
The Boston juvenile court or the juvenile sessions of any district court of the 
commonwealth, except the municipal court of the city of Boston, upon the petition 
of any person alleging on behalf of a child under the age of sixteen years within the 
jurisdiction of said court that said child is without necessary and proper physical, 
educational or moral care and discipline, or is growing up under conditions or 
circumstances damaging to a child's sound character development, or who lacks 
proper attention of parent, guardian with care and custody, or custodian, and whose 
parents or guardian are unwilling, incompetent, or unavailable to provide such care, 
may issue a precept to bring such child before said court, shall issue a notice to the 
department, and shall issue summons to both parents of the child to show cause 
why the child should not be committed to the custody of the department of public 
welfare or other appropriate order made. 
2 E.g., Care and Protection of Three Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 7ll-12, 467 N.E.2d 851, 
857 (1984) ("clear and convincing" rather than "preponderance of the evidence" standard 
must be met for parental rights to be terminated); Petition of Worcester Children's Friend 
Society to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 602, 402 N.E.2d 
ll16, ll21 (1980) ("extra measure" of evidentiary protection appropriate for parents justifies 
flexibility in application of evidentiary rules). 
3 E.g., Petition of Dep't of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 384 
Mass. 707, 710-ll, 429 N.E.2d 685, 687 (1981) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to parental 
rights termination hearing); Petition of Dep't of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to 
Adoption, 383 Mass. 573, 592-93, 421 N.E.2d 28, 39 (1981) ("beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard of proof inapplicable); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 746, 379 N .E.2d 1053, 
1061 (1978) (double jeopardy doctrine inapplicable). 
1
Applebaum et al.: Chapter 4: Domestic Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1986
100 1986 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 4.1 
amendment right against self-incrimination.4 This right implies that a fact-
finder may not draw adverse inferences against a criminal defendant 
merely because he or she fails to testify at trial,S Not only may the fact-
finder not infer that the defendant's testimony would be incriminating, 
but the prosecutor may not call the jury's attention to the defendant's 
failure to testify or speculate on what the defendant's testimony might 
have been.6 Furthermore, the right against self-incrimination protects 
both civil and criminal litigants from adverse inferences when a non-
party witness refuses to testify on fifth amendment grounds.7 Moreover, 
when a witness does incriminate himself through testimony in an unre-
lated proceeding, that testimony may not be used against the witness in 
a later criminal trial. 8 In both civil and criminal cases, however, most 
states agree that an adverse inference may be drawn from a party's failure 
to call a witness, especially if the witness is readily available to the party 
and would be a natural witness to rebut the opponent's case.9 
Similarly, Massachusetts allows the fact-finder to draw an adverse 
inference when a party fails to call a witness who might reasonably be 
expected to have been called if his or her testimony would have been 
favorable to the party. 10 This rule was explained in the 1960 case of Grady 
4 U.S. CoNST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides: "No person ... shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... /d. The fifth amendment 
applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 
(1964). 
s United States v. Walker, 313 F.2d 236, 237-38 (6th Cir. 1963), cert den., 374 U.S. 807 
(1963); United States v. Molin, 244 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (D. Mass. 1%5). 
6 E.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1967). 
7 United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 12ll (lst Cir. 1973) (neither side may benefit 
from inference that witness would take fifth if called). But see, Marine Midland Bank v. 
John E. Russo Produce Co., Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 31, 42, 405 N.E.2d 205, 2ll, 427 N.Y.S.2d 
961, 967 (1980) (adverse inference extends even to witness taking fifth amendment in civil 
trial). 
8 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973). 
9 See, e.g., Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 675, 165 A.2d 598, 600 
(1960) (failure of tort plaintiff to produce doctor to testify concerning plaintiff's injuries 
allowed fact-finder to infer injuries were not serious); Wood v. Mobil Chemical Co., 50 Ill. 
App. 3d 465, 473-74, 365 N.E.2d 1087, 1093 (1977); Roy v. Phelps, 488 So. 2d 468, 470 
(La. Ct. App. 1986); Graeff v. Baptist Temple of Springfield, 576 S.W.2d 291, 306 (Mo. 
1978). Cf Fruehauf Corp. v. Trustees of First United Methodist Church, 387 So. 2d 106, 
ll2 (Miss. 1980). But see, Adams v. Mallory, 308 Md. 453, 465, 520 A.2d 371, 377 (1987) 
(alleged father's failure to testify in paternity suit does not permit adverse inference or 
reference to failure to testify). 
10 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. United Food Corp., 374 Mass. 765, 771-72, 374 N.E.2d 
1331, 1338 (1978); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 366 Mass. 284, 293-94, 318 N.E.2d 469,476 
(1974); Commonwealth v. DeCaro, 359 Mass. 388, 392, 269 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Smith, 342 Mass. 180, 186-87, 172 N.E.2d 597, 602 (1961); Commonwealth 
v. O'Rourke, 3ll Mass. 213, 222, 40 N.E.2d 883, 887-88 (1942). 
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v. Collins Transportation Co. 11 In Grady, the court granted an auto 
accident defendant the right to raise the adverse inference against the 
plaintiff, who failed to produce as witnesses the passengers in his own 
car. 12 The Grady Court allowed the fact-finder to infer that the testimony 
of the passengers would have been unfavorable to the plaintiff. 13 Ac-
cording to the Grady Court, the strength of the inference depends on the 
relative availability of the witnesses to each party, 14 whether the party 
could explain the absence of the witnesses, 15 and the strength of the 
evidence against the party. 16 The inference is strongest where, as in 
Grady, a party against whom it is being drawn has much easier access 
to the witness than the opposing party and the opposing party has made 
its caseY 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court applied the civil 
"adverse inference rule" to a child custody hearing for the first time. 18 
In Custody of Two Minors, the Court held that in the course of a hearing 
in which the Department of Social Services sought custody over abused 
children, the fact-finder could draw an adverse inference from the failure 
of the children's parents to testify because they were available to do so. 19 
Based upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence of child abuse 
and neglect, the Court upheld a district judge's award of custody of two 
children to the Department of Social Services. 20 
In Custody of Two Minors, a district court judge ordered two minor 
children removed from their parents' home and committed to the custody 
of the Department of Social Services. 21 The Department presented evi-
dence of a long history of parental abuse. 22 The district court held a 
11 341 Mass. 502, 170 N.E.2d 725 (1960). 
12 /d. at 510, 170 N.E.2d at 729. 
13 /d. at 505, 170 N.E.2d at 727. 
14 /d. at 506, 170 N.E.2d at 726-27. 
15 /d. at 510, 170 N.E.2d at 727-28. 
16 /d. at 506, 170 N.E.2d at 727. The inference should not be drawn unless "'the evidence 
against [the party] is so strong that, if innocent, he would be expected to call them."' /d. 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Finnerty, 148 Mass. 162, 167, 19 N.E. 215, 217 (1889)). 
17 See id. at 509, 170 N.E.2d at 729. Plaintiff knew all his passengers, plaintiff did not 
explain why none had been produced, and plaintiff's testimony was contradicted by three 
opposing witnesses. /d. 
18 Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. 610, 617, 487 N.E.2d 1358, 1363-64 (1986). 
19 /d. 
20 /d. at 615, 487 N.E.2d at 1363. 
21 Id. at 610-11, 487 N.E.2d at 1360. 
22 /d. at 612-14, 487 N.E.2d at 1360-62. The eldest child had allegedly suffered numerous 
beatings, a scalding with hot water, and several burns. /d. at 612-13, 487 N.E.2d at 1361. 
When the child was five months old, the parents voluntarily committed him to the care of 
the Department for one and a half months after the father had slapped the baby, requiring 
that the baby be hospitalized. /d. at 612, 487 N.E.2d at 1361. The parents were often 
3
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hearing to determine whether the children should be permanently com-
mitted to the custody of the Department. 23 The district court found, based 
on the record before it, that the parents were unfit to care for the children 
and inferred from their failure to testify at the hearing that they were 
"'not able or willing to express themselves as capable of giving the love 
and care their children need. "'24 For these reasons, the district judge 
granted custody of both children to the Department. 25 When the parents 
appealed, the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own 
motion. 26 
On appeal, the parents argued that the district court judge should not 
have drawn an adverse inference from their failure to testify, because 
they were protected by a right against self· incrimination. 27 Rejecting the 
parents' argument, the Court held that a judge may draw an adverse 
inference from the parents' failure to testify in a custody proceeding.28 
The Court reasoned that in a civil action, refusal of a party to testify 
on grounds of self-incrimination may give rise to an adverse inference. 29 
The inference can only be drawn, however, when the opponent has 
presented evidence such that the failure to testify would be a "fair subject 
of comment. "30 
violent toward each other, and the mother threatened to kill the younger child at least 
twice. /d. at 613, 487 N.E.2d at 1361. The Department removed both children from the 
home in Aprill981 and again in June 1981, while providing support services for the parents. 
Id. at 613, 487 N.E.2d at 1361-62. 
23 Id. at 615, 487 N.E.2d at 1363. 
24 /d. at 616, 487 N.E.2d at 1363. The district judge also noted that although no evidence 
had been presented that the younger child had actually been abused, the court had the 
authority to remove her from the home as a preventive measure. /d. at 615, 487 N.E.2d at 
1363. 
25 /d. at 610-11, 487 N.E.2d at 1360. 
26 /d. at 611, 487 N.E.2d at 1360. The Supreme Judicial Court has the discretion to 
transfer cases from a lower court to itself. G.L. c. 211, § 4A (West 1985). 
27 Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. at 611, 487 N .E.2d at 1360. The parents also argued 
that the evidence before the district court did not satisfy the level of proof required to 
terminate their parental rights. /d. at 620-21, 487 N.E.2d at 1366. Easily disposing of this 
contention, the Court held that the district judge correctly found the evidence of the parents' 
unfitness to be "clear and convincing." /d. at 619, 487 N.E.2d at 1365. The Court stated 
that the district judge must be accorded deference in evaluating the evidence unless there 
is clear error. /d. at 618,487 N.E.2d at 1364. The district judge here had made sufficiently 
detailed and specific findings to support the removal of the children, the Court noted. /d. 
at 619, 487 N.E.2d at 1365. Evidence that the parents had abused the eldest child was 
undisputed, and the district court had the authority to take preventive measures where the 
evidence showed that a child would be abused or neglected, even if the abuse or neglect 
has not yet occurred. /d. at 620, 487 N.E.2d at 1365-66. 
28 /d. at 617, 487 N.E.2d at 1363-64. 
29 /d. at 616, 487 N.E.2d at 1363. 
30 /d. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1986 [1986], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1986/iss1/7
§ 4.1 DOMESTIC RELATIONS 103 
While custody proceedings are not ordinary civil cases, the Court 
noted, the full range of constitutional rights afforded a criminal defendant 
is not available to custody litigantsY The right of parents to custody of 
their children is not as strong as the interest of a criminal defendant, the 
Court reasoned, because the state acts not to punish the parents, but to 
protect the childrenY While parents have a fundamental right to posses-
sion of their children, the Court noted that the right is not absolute, and 
children have at least as compelling a right to a safe and stable environ-
ment.33 
Stating that Massachusetts has generally denied parents in child cus-
tody proceedings the rights of criminal defendants,34 the Court cited prior 
decisions where the criminal defendant's right to the "exclusionary 
rule,"35 right to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof,36 and 
protection against double jeopardy37 did not apply in child custody cases. 
The Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had also denied 
child custody litigants the indigent criminal defendant's right to a free 
court appointed attorney. 38 The Court stressed that parents were afforded 
sufficient procedural protection by the "clear and convincing" standard 
of proof and the requirement that they be permitted representation by 
counsel. 39 The Court thus extended its practice of denying custody liti-
gants the protections of criminal pr.ocedure to the right against self-
incrimination. 
By allowing a judge to draw an adverse inference from the parents' 
failure to testify, the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Custody of 
Two Minors provides a sound extension of the principles guiding Mas-
sachusetts custody procedure. This holding logically extends the Mas-
sachusetts doctrine that parents in child custody proceedings do not have 
as strong procedural protections as criminal defendants. The Court has 
held that the right of parents to guardianship of their children is a fun-
31 /d. 
32 /d. at 617, 487 N.E.2d at 1363. 
"/d. at 617, 487 N.E.2d at 1364. 
34 /d. 
35 
./d. at 617, 487 N.E.2d at 1363 (citing Petition of Dep't of Social Services to Dispense 
with Consent to Adoption, 384 Mass. 707, 710-11, 429 N.E.2d 685, 687 (1981) (department's 
prior, possibly improper placing of child in foster home did not "taint" subsequent pro-
ceedings to dispense with consent to adoption)). 
36 /d. (citing Petition of Dep't of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 
383 Mass. 573, 592-93, 421 N.E.2d 28, 39 (19.81)). 
37 M .. (citing Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 746, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1061 (1978) (trial 
de novo in superior court proper on appeal from district court custody ruling)). 
38 /d. at 618, 487 N.E.2d at 1364 (citing Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 
18, 33 (1981)). 
39 /d. at 618, 487 N.E.2d at 1364. 
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damental, constitutionally protected right,40 giving rise to certain proce-
dural protections for parents in parental rights termination hearings which 
are not available to civillitigants. 41 Nevertheless, because the purpose 
of a custody hearing is to protect a child rather than to punish the parents, 
the Court has stated that such a hearing is more closely analogous to a 
civil than to a criminal trial.42 Therefore, in general, the appropriate 
safeguards of the parents' procedural rights are those accorded a civil 
litigant, not those provided for a criminal defendant. 43 
The decision in Custody of Two Minors comports with both Massa-
chusetts and United States Supreme Court precedent denying parents in 
custody proceedings the procedural rights afforded criminal defendants. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has denied parents in custody hearings the 
rights enjoyed by criminal defendants in regard to the exclusionary rule 
and protection against double jeopardy.44 It has also followed the the 
United States Supreme Court in holding that the state need only provide 
"clear and convincing" evidence of parental unfitness to terminate the 
rights of natural parents.45 This is a higher standard than the mere "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" required in civil litigation but less than the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of criminal trials. Although states 
are free to set an even higher standard if they choose,46 Massachusetts 
has not done so and adheres to the "clear and convincing" standard.47 
The United States Supreme Court has also denied child custody litigants 
the criminal defendant's rights to habeas corpus review48 and to free 
court appointed counsel. 49 
It is appropriate for the state to provide greater protections for the 
criminal defendant than for the custody litigant because the state interest 
in protecting innocent criminal defendants from conviction is greater than 
40 Petition of Dep't of Public Welfare, 383 Mass. at 587, 421 N.E.2d at 36; Petition of 
Department of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 
689, 693, 482 N.E.2d 535, 538 (1985). 
41 See supra note 2. 
42 Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. at 746, 379 N.E.2d at 1061 (double jeopardy doctrine 
is inapplicable to custody cases because "parents are neither convicted nor subject to any 
sort of punishment"). 
43Jd. 
44 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
45 See supra note 35. The United States Supreme Court set the "clear and convincing" 
standard for termination of parental rights in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 
(1982). 
46 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769-70. 
47 See, e.g., Custody of a Minor (No. 2), 392 Mass. 719, 725, 467 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 
(1984); Care & Protection of Three Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 711-12, 467 N.E.2d 851, 857 
(1984); Custody of a Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 766, 452 N.E.2d 483, 490 (1983). 
48 Lehman v. Lycoming County, 458 U.S 502, 515-16 (1982). 
49 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33. 
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its interest in protecting parents from losing custody of their children. 
This is because the state must weigh the interests of the children along 
with those of the state and against those of the parents. 5° 
The adverse inference rule can be further justified as a proper measure 
for the court to take to encourage the parents to testify. The testimony 
of the parents is an important tool in helping the judge evaluate the 
quality of the family environment and decide whether the child's best 
interests will be served by removing him or her from the home. In the 
absence of the parents' testimony, the judge must rely on the records of 
the public agency, which can observe the home environment only inter-
mittently and in an artificial context. 
The parents' argument that they are protected against the adverse 
inference from failure to testify by a right against self-incrimination is 
insupportable. If the parents testify, they are protected against self-in-
crimination by the rule of Lefkowitz v. Turley, which prevents their 
testimony from being used against them in a later criminal trial. 51 Because 
parental testimony would not subject parents to the risk of criminal 
prosecution for the abuse of their child, their procedural rights fall below 
those of criminal defendants. Parents' rights against "self-incrimination" 
should not extend to their being protected from having adverse testimony 
elicited from them in a child custody case because, as the Court noted, 
an adverse custody order does not "punish" them in the criminal sense. 52 
Custody of Two Minors correctly applied the conditions set forth in 
Grady v. Collins Transportation53 for permitting an adverse inference to 
be drawn against a party for failing to call a witness. 54 The conditions 
discussed in Grady were favorable to allowing the inference in Custody 
of Two Minors. First, the witnesses, the parents themselves, were ob-
viously available to testify and apparently did not explain their failure to 
do so. 55 Second, the evidence presented by the state, the opposing party, 
50 See Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. at 617, 487 N.E.2d at 1364. The Court's 
assertion that parents are not "punished" by the loss of custody is rather dubious. See id. 
at 616, 487 N.E.2d at 1363. It seems obvious that the parents are contesting the award of 
custody to the state precisely because they are unwilling to give up custody of the children 
voluntarily and would suffer pain akin to that of "punishment" if the children were taken 
from them. In the instant case, however, the parents had an opportunity, which they 
declined, to testify and to express to the court how much pain they would feel if the 
department obtained custody of their children. The court could reasonably conclude from 
their failure to testify that the parents had no interest analogous to the criminal defendant's 
interest in avoiding unjust punishment. 
51 See Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 78. 
52 Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. at 616, 487 N.E.2d at 1363. 
53 341 Mass. 502, 170 N.E.2d 725 (1960). 
54 See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. 
55 See generally Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. at 616, 487 N.E.2d at 1363. 
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was sufficiently convincing for the judge to reasonably conclude that the 
parents would have testified if they could have rebutted the adverse 
evidence. 56 
The result in Custody of Two Minors instructs Massachusetts attorneys 
to encourage their clients to testify when the state agency seeking custody 
has presented substantial evidence of child abuse or neglect. Under the 
Custody of Two Minors rule, it will be difficult for parents to retain 
custody if the state has presented credible evidence of specific instances 
of abuse or neglect. Even if parents cannot rebut the agency's charges 
of abuse or neglect, they may be able to convince the judge that they 
have enough love and concern for the child that the "clear and convinc-
ing" standard for determination of parental unfitness has not been met .57 
In Custody of Two Minors, the Supreme Judicial Court considered the 
question of whether the rule allowing an adverse inference to be drawn 
from a party's failure to call a witness should apply to child custody 
proceedings. The Court held that a reasonable inference may be drawn 
against parents who fail to testify on their own behalf when the state 
seeks custody of their children. The decision follows the Massachusetts 
trend of denying child custody litigants the full range of rights granted to 
criminal defendants. The rule is sound policy because it encourages 
parents, who are the best source of evidence regarding the quality of the 
home environment, to testify. Finally, the decision does not unfairly 
prejudice parents' rights because parental interests are not as strong as 
those of criminal defendants. Thus, the holding in Custody of Two Minors 
is a sound extension of the principles of Massachusetts child custody 
procedure. 
§ 4.2. Contract in Derogation of Marriage.* Traditionally, courts have 
held contracts that interfere with the marital relationship or facilitate 
divorce to be void and unenforceable because they violate the public 
policy in favor of preserving marriage. 1 For example, most jurisdictions 
hold that an agreement to marry, entered into while at least one of the 
56 See id. at 619, 487 N.E.2d at 1365. 
57 See, e.g, Matter of Harden, 51 Or. App. 681, 687, 626 P.2d 944, 947 (1981) (where 
father demonstrates great interest in caring for child, his history of criminal activity is not 
dispositive evidence of parental unfitness); In re Interest of Hurley, 44 Ill. App. 3d 260, 
267, 357 N.E.2d 815, 820 (1976) (mother's interest in caring for child, not her success, is 
determinative of parental fitness). 
*Carole A. Casey, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.2. 1 See generally annotation, What Constitutes Contract Between Husband or Wife 
and Third Person Promotive of Divorce or Separation, 93 A.L.R.3d 523 (1979) for a 
discussion of contracts held invalid because they encouraged divorce. 
8
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parties is still married to another person, is void as against public policy.2 
Yet state legislatures and courts recently have been more willing to 
uphold contracts which previously were considered void and unenforce-
able as detrimental to the marital relationship,3 most likely in response 
to the social changes of the last two decades, including an increase in 
divorce and in the number of cohabitating couples.4 For example, anten-
uptial contracts settling property and alimony rights upon divorce are 
upheld in most jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, if the contract is 
preceded by fair disclosure and does not unreasonably encourage di-
vorce.5 Cohabitation contracts governing property division upon sepa-
ration are enforceable also, recognizing that many couples choose to 
share a household with no intention of marrying. 6 Furthermore, oral 
agreeJ.llents for support in exchange for services will be upheld as long 
as the "services" provided are not sexual services.7 Although each of 
these contracts denigrate the marital relationship to some extent, courts 
2 Malasarte v. Keye, 13 Alaska 407 (1951); Lowe v. Quinn, 27 N.Y.2d 397, 267 N.E.2d 
251, 318 N.Y.S.2d 467 (l971); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 193 Misc. 299, 86 N.Y.S.2d 196 
(1948); McNeil v. Brogan, 201 Okla. 125, 202 P.2d 696 (1949); Jones v. Allen, 14 Wash. 2d 
Ill, t'27 P.2d 265 (1942); Davis v. Davis, 3 Wash. 2d 448, 101 P.2d 313 (1940); annotation, 
What Constitutes Contract Between Husband or Wife and Third Person Promotive of 
Divorce or Separation, 93 A.L.R.3d 523 (1979). Although Massachusetts has abolished 
actions for breach of promise to marry, other actions based on the breach may be main-
tained, for example an action to recover an engagement ring. LOMBARD, FAMILY LAW, 2 
MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 1090 (1967). 
3 Donna, Domestic Relations, 1981 ANN.SURV. MAss. LAw§ 3.1. The Supreme Judicial 
Court has noted that the Massachusetts legislature has changed several laws to. facilitate 
divorce. Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 598, 428 N.E.2d 810, 815 (1981). The Osborne 
Court declared that antenuptial contracts were no longer against public policy and void per 
se. Id. at 598, 428 N.E.2d at 816. See generally 24 AM. JuR. 2D Divorce and Separation 
§§ 889-894 (1983) for a discussion of contracts between spouses which are no longer void 
as against public policy. 
4 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-20, No. 389, MARITAL 
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1983 (1984). 
5 Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981). See generally LOMBARD, 
FAMILY LAW, 2 MASS PRACTICE SERIES§§ ll9l, ll95 (1967). 
6 Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). See Hunter, 
An Essay on Contract and Status: Race, Marriage and the Meretricious Spouse, 64 VA. 
L. REv. 1039, 1076-96 (1978); Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 
65 CALIF. L. REV. 937 (1977); Levin & Spak, Judicial Enforcement of Cohabitation 
Agreements: A Signal to Purge Marriage From the Statute of Frauds, 12 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 499 (1979); Note, Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for Quasi-Spousal Support, 30 STAN. 
L. REv. 359 (1978). 
7 Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 337 N.E.2d 691 (1975) (recovery allowed under 
quantum meruit for services rendered in reliance on defendant's oral promise to compensate 
plaintiff in his will); Cummings v. Brenci, 334 Mass. 144, 134 N.E.2d 133 (1956) (married 
woman, separated from husband, may recover under quantum meruit for services rendered 
in exchange for promise to compensate her in his will). 
9
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have stated that where the harm is incidental to the basic purpose of the 
contract, the agreement does not offend public policy.8 
On the other hand, courts continue to strike down contracts which 
have as their primary purpose the destruction of an existing marital 
relationship. 9 California courts, however, recognize the validity of such 
contracts if the marriage was already beyond saving at the time the 
agreement was entered into, on the grounds that public policy does not 
discourage divorce where the marriage is already broken. 10 Thus, ac-
cording to California courts, where the first marriage is already beyond 
saving when one party promises to support the other, the promise to 
divorce one's spouse is merely incidental to the agreement and therefore 
does not violate public policy. 11 
During the Survey year, in Capazzoli v. Holzwasser, 12 the Supreme 
Judicial Court considered the issue of whether a contract made in con-
sideration of a person's promise to divorce their spouse is enforceable. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the Commonwealth's interest in 
preserving the marital relationship and refused to allow recovery, under 
any theory, for breach of an oral agreement for support when an integral 
part of the agreement is the plaintiff's promise to divorce his or her 
spouse. 13 Nevertheless, the Court vacated the lower court's dismissal of 
the plaintiff's complaint, allowing the plaintiffto move for leave to amend 
her complaint in the event that promises were exchanged between the 
plaintiff and the defendant where a significant part of the consideration 
did not require the plaintiff to abandon her marriage. 14 Thus, the Court 
implied that it will recognize the validity of an oral agreement for support 
8 Gleason v. Mann, 312 Mass. 420, 45 N.E.2d 280 (1943) (temporary reasonable restraint 
on marriage, which is incidental to another lawful purpose of the agreement, is not contrary 
to public policy); Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981) (setting 
guidelines on antenuptial agreements). 
9 Malasarte v. Keye, 13 Alaska 407 (1951), Lowe v. Quinn, 27 N.Y.2d 397, 267 N.E.2d 
251, 318 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1971); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 193 Misc. 299, 86 N.Y.S.2d 196 
(1948); McNeil v. Brogan, 201 Okla. 125, 202 P.2d 6% (1949); Jones v. Allen, 14 Wash. 2d 
111, 127 P.2d 265 (1942); Davis v. Davis, 3 Wash. 2d 448, 101 P.2d 313 (1940). 
10 Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 225, 317 P.2d 613, 621 (1957). In Spellens, the 
plaintiff divorced her husband and waived all rights to community property and alimony in 
reliance on the defendant's promise that she would not need any money because he would 
marry her and support her three children. Id. at 214, 317 P.2d at 615. The court held that 
the agreement was not against public policy because the plaintiff's first marriage was 
already broken and beyond repair at the time the agreement was entered into. Jd. at 225, 
317 P.2d at 621. 
11 Id. at 225, 317 P.2d at 622. 
12 397 Mass. 158, 490 N.E.2d 420 (1986). 
13 /d. at 160, 490 N.E.2d at 422. 
14 Id. at 161, 490 N.E.2d at 423. 
10
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in exchange for services as long as the essential consideration for the 
contract is not the divorce of a ·spouse. 
In Capazzoli, the plaintiff alleged that she entered into an oral agree-
ment with the defendant whereby the defendant promised to support the 
plaintiff and her children for the rest of her life in return for plaintiff's 
promise to divorce her current husband and relinquish all marital rights. 15 
The plaintiff also agreed to run the defendant's household, provide com-
panionship and act as a "loyal and dutiful friend. "16 The plaintiff did in 
fact give up her marriage and begin living with the defendant, and in 
return the defendant supported plaintiff and her children "for a substantial 
period of time. "17 When the defendant stopped supporting the plaintiff, 
she filed a complaint for breach of contract and sought recovery for 
services rendered under a theory of quantum meruit. 18 The superior court 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 19 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own 
initiative.20 The Court concluded that the complaint was properly dis-
missed, holding that, "as an expression of public policy, ... a contract 
containing as an essential provision the requirement that one of the 
contracting parties will abandon that party's marriage to a third person, 
is unenforceable in this Commonwealth on a contract, quantum meruit, 
or any other theory."21 The Court pointed out that both the legislature 
and the Supreme Judicial Court have expressed the State's deep interest 
in strengthening and encouraging family life. 22 Noting that marriage is 
15 /d. at 158-59, 490 N.E.2d at 421. 
16 /d. at 159, 490 N.E.2d at 421. 
17 Id. at 158-59, 490 N.E.2d at 421. Apparently the defendant supported the plaintiff for 
close to thirteen years. The plaintiff contracted with the defendant in the fall of 1970 and 
filed this complaint in January 1984. /d. at 158, 490 N.E.2d at 421. 
18 /d. at 159, 490 N.E.2d at 421-22. Quantum meruit is an equitable doctrine whereby a 
person may recover the reasonable value of his or her labor or materials provided so that 
the defendant is not unjustly enriched. The plaintiff in this case also sought recovery for 
negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. /d. 
19 /d. at 159-60, 490 N.E.2d at 422. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under 
MASS. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
w /d. at 158, 490 N.E.2d at 421. 
21 /d. at 160, 490 N.E.2d at 422. 
22 /d. at 160-61, 490 N.E.2d at 422. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited G.L. c. 
119, § 1 (1984 ed.) ("the policy of the [C]ommonwealth [is] to direct its efforts ... to the 
strengthening and encouragement of family life"). In addition, the Court cited several 
instances where the Supreme Judicial Court has expressed the state's public policy. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175, 449 N.E.2d 357, 360 (1983) (the 
Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in proscribing conduct which threatens marriage); 
Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 599, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981) (certain contracts so 
unreasonably encourage divorce they are void as a matter of public policy); Green v. 
Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 51, 337 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1975) ("Massachusetts has a strong 
public interest in ensuring that its rules governing marriage are not subverted"); French v. 
11
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the foundation of the family, the Court stated that the Commonwealth 
has a valid intetest in prohibiting behavior which threatens the marital 
relationship. 23 The Court concluded, therefore, that where the essential 
consideration of the contract was the abandonment of an existing mar-
riage, the contract was void and unenforceable. 24 
The Court distinguished its earlier decision in Green v. Richmond,25 
upon which the plaintiff relied, by pointing out that in that case, the 
plaintiff's promise to render services in return for the decedent's promise 
to leave his estate to her did not rely on a promise to abandon her 
marriage. 26 In fact, the Capazzoli Court noted, the plaintiff in that case 
was divorced before she met the decedent. 27 In contrast, the Court said, 
the plaintiff in Capazzoli promised to abandon her marriage as consid-
eration for the defendant's promise to support her. 28 Because every count 
in the plaintiff's complaint asserted that consideration for the agreement 
was the abandonment of her marriage, the Court determined that it 
appeared, therefore, beyond a reasonable doubt, "that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of her claim which [will] entitle [her] to 
relief. "29 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's complaint 
was t>roperly dismissed. 30 The Court vacated the dismissal, however, and 
gave the plaintiff permission to move to amend her complaint, noting 
that there was a strong policy in favor of allowing the amendment of 
pleadings. 31 
Justice Abrams, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that under the 
generous rules of pleading in Massachusetts, the original complaint 
should not have been dismissed by the trial court.J2 The Justice reasoned 
McAnary, 290 Mass. 544, .546, 195 N.E. 714, 715 (1935) (marriage is not merely a contract 
but the foundation of the family, therefore, "the Commonwealth has a deep interest that 
its integrity is not jeopardized"). 
23 Id. at 161, 490 N.E.2d at 422 (citing Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175, 
449 N.E.2d 357, 360 (1983)). 
24 Id. at 160, 490 N.E.2d at 422. 
25 369 Mass. 47, 337 N.E.2d 691 (1975). In that case, the plaintiff, a divorced woman, 
contracted with a man where she would provide household services and companionship in 
return for his promise to leave his estate to her. Id. at 48, 337 N.E.2d at 694. 
26 397 Mass. 158, 161, 490 N.E.2d 420, 422-23. 
27 Id. at 161, 490 N.E.2d at 423. 
2s Id. 
29 Id. at 160, 490 N.E.2d at 422 (citing Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98, 360 N.E.2d 
870, 872 (1957)). 
30 ld. The plaintiff did not request leave to amend her complaint; but nevertheless, the 
Court granted her leave to amend her complaint in light of the strong policy favoring 
amendments of pleadings in the MASS. R. C1v. P. Id. 
31 Id. 
32 ld. at 162, 490 N.E.2d at 423 (Abrams, J., concurring). Justice Abrams also stated that 
even if the trial judge did not recognize any claims, he should have allowed the plaintiff 
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that under a liberal construction, the plaintiff stated at least two enforce-
able contract claims. 33 Because the plaintiff's complaint stated that she 
rendered services in exchange for promises of support on several different 
occasions, the Justice asserted, the plaintiff may be able to prove that 
those occasions were subsequent to her divorce and therefore did not 
violate public policy. 34 
Justice Abrams stated further that because the trial judge was address-
ing the novel issue of whether an agreement which relies on the aban-
donment of marriage is enforceable, the court should have allowed the 
parties to "develop the facts and explore the issues. "35 Perhaps an ex-
ception to the general rule voiding contracts in derogation of marriage 
could be developed, the Justice reasoned, where the first marriage was 
already broken.36 Justice Abrams pointed out that such an approach has 
been accepted already in two California cases.J7 
Justice Abrams also pointed out that the Court already has utilized 
this exception to permit an attorney to recover for services rendered in 
a divorce action under an unenforceable contingency fee arrangement. 38 
The Justice noted that generally a contingency fee agreement in a divorce 
action is unenforceable because it violates public policy in that it gives 
the attorney incentive to prevent a possible reconciliation. 39 The Court 
permitted a recovery in that case because the marriage was already 
abandoned and there was no indication in the record that either party 
had the slightest interest in reconciliation. 40 
The Capazzoli decision, therefore, emphasizes the Commonwealth's 
deep interest in protecting the marital relationship. This strong statement 
of public policy is significant to the practitioner particularly at the plead-
ings stage. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must 
leave to amend her complaint to state her claims more explicitly. This approach would 
have been more in line with the generosity required by rule 12(b)(6) and supported by case 
law. The majority opinion, on the other hand, simply allowed the plaintiff to move for leave 
to amend her complaint, leaving open the possibility that the superior court, in its discretion, 
would deny the motion. Id. 
33 Id. at 162-63, 490 N.E.2d at 423-24 (Abrams, J., concurring). 
34 /d. at 162, 490 N.E.2d at 423 (Abrams, J., concurring). 
35 Id. at 165, 490 N.E.2d at 425 (Abrams, J., concurring). 
36 Id. Justice Abrams asserts that an exception to the general rule voiding such contracts 
where the marriage is already beyond repair "enjoys reasonable support elsewhere." Id. 
The Justice does not, however, cite additional support other than that from the state of 
California. See supra note 10. 
37 Id. (citing Glickman v. Collins, 13 Cal. 3d 852, 533 P.2d 204, 120 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1975); 
Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957)). 
38 Id. at 164, 490 N.E.2d at 424-25 (Abrams, J., concurring) (citing Guenard v. Burke, 
387 Mass. 802, 443 N.E.2d 892 (1982)). 
39 Id. at 164-65, 490 N.E.2d at 424-25 (Abrams, J., concurring). 
40 /d. at 164, 490 N.E.2d at 424-25 (Abrams, J., concurring). 
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clearly state valid consideration for the contract other than the abandon-
ment of an existing marriage. At trial, the court will evaluate whether 
abandonment of the first marriage formed the "essential': consideration 
for the contract. Although the court will strike down contracts which 
rely on the abandonment of an existing marriage, the Capazzoli Court 
implied that it will consider the enforceability of a claim where divorce 
from one's spouse was not an "integral" or "essential" part of the con-
tract.41 
The Court's opinion in Capazzoli follows the general trend in other 
jurisdictions that hold that contracts entered into in consideration of the 
destruction of an existing marriage are void and unenforceable.42 The 
Court does not, however, address the next logical step which is to form 
an exception to this general rule in cases where the marriage is already 
beyond repair at the time the contract was entered into.43 As the Cali-
fornia courts have already recognized, if the first marriage was already 
broken, then the divorce from the first spouse most likely was not a 
significant consideration in the agreement. 44 To allow such an exception 
would be a logical extension of the Court's previous decision permitting 
an attorney to recover under an unenforceable contingency fee arrange-
ment where the couple he represented were beyond reconciliation. 45 As 
Justice Abrams pointed out in her concurring opinion, the Court has 
subordinated the importance of marital stability in favor of other policy 
considerations on several other occasions.46 
The Capazzoli decision refusing to enforce contracts which rely on one 
party's divorce furthers public policy only in a situation where the spouse 
is encouraged to abandon a basically stable relationship and family life 
41 397 Mass. at 160, 490 N .E.2d at 422. Massachusetts recognizes an enforceable contract 
for support in exchange for household services. Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 337 
N.E.2d 691 (1975) (recovery for services rendered in reliance on decedent's oral promise 
to compensate her by will). See also Rizzo v. Cunningham, 303 Mass. 16, 20 N.E.2d 471 
(1939) (young girl allowed to recover for services rendered in return for woman's promise 
that she would leave everything to her). 
42 See supra note 2. 
43 This approach is followed by California courts. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 
317 P.2d 613 (1957). See also Glickman v. Collins, 13 Cal. 3d 852, 533 P.2d 204, 120 Cal. 
Rptr. 76 (1975). 
44 Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d at 225, 317 P.2d at 621; Glickman, 13 Cal. 3d at 858-59,533 P.2d 
at 208, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
45 Guenard v. Burke, 387 Mass. 802, 443 N.E.2d 892 (1982). 
46 397 Mass. at 164, 490 N.E.2d at 424 (Abrams, J., concurring). Justice Abrams cited 
several instances where the Court has "subordinated marital harmony to other social 
values." See, e.g., Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 361, 455 N.E.2d 
1203, 1206 (1983) (not recognizing spousal privilege not to testify against other spouse 
although that testimony may be highly destructive of their marriage); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 
Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976) (abolishing interspousal tort immunity). Id. 
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in favor of a dubious "better deal" rather than attempting to reconcile 
difficulties in the present relationship. Although the Commonwealth has 
a valid interest in encouraging couples to work out their differences in 
order to preserve a family unit, this policy is misplaced where the mar-
riage is so broken and destructive that there is no hope of reconciliation. 
Dissolution of such a marriage does not violate public policy because it 
opens the possibility that more fruitful family relationships will be formed 
elsewhere. 47 
In sum, the Capazzoli decision underlines the Commonwealth's strong 
policy favoring stable marital relationships. Thus, contracts where a 
significant part of the consideration is the abandonment of an existing 
marriage are void and unenforceable as against public policy. Contracts 
based on valid consideration apart from the abandonment of an existing 
marriage, however, will survive a motion to dismiss if pleaded properly. 
§ 4.3. Divorce Decrees - Survival and Specific Enforcement of Separa-
tion Agreements.* In Massachusetts, a husband and wife may choose to 
enter into a separation agreement in order to privately settle their marital 
obligations in contemplation of divorce. 1 Such agreements commonly set 
forth the rights and duties of the parties, with respect to alimony, custody, 
and disposition of marital property. 2 A probate court may incorporate a 
separation agreement into its judgment of divorce, upon a finding that 
the agreement is fair, reasonable, and free from fraud or coercion. 3 
Regardless of whether a court chooses to incorporate a separation 
agreement into its judgment of divorce, the agreement may survive the 
judgment and continue to exist as an enforceable contract independent 
of the divorce decree. 4 The likelihood that a separation agreement will 
survive ajudgment usually depends on the intent of the parties in forming 
the contract.5 For instance, the pmies may stipulate that the separation 
agreement will not survive a divorcejudgment.6 In such a case, the parties 
47 Glickman, 13 Cal. 3d at 858-59, 533 P.2d at 208, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
*Mary V. Deck, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.3. 1 J. LOMBARD, FAMILY LAW, 2 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES§ 1252 (1967); see, e.g., 
Schillander .v. Schillander, 307 Mass. 96, 98, 29 N.E.2d 686, 687 (1940); Bailey v. Dillon, 
186 Mass. 244, 246, 71 N.E. 538, 539 (1904). 
2 J. LOMBARD, FAMILY LAW, 2 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 1252 (1967 & Supp. 1984). 
Parties may not contract to release themselves from statutory duties of child support. Ryan 
v. Ryan, 371 Mass. 430, 432, 358 N.E.2d 431, 432 (1976); Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 
437, 358 N.E.2d 432, 436 (1976). 
3 Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 91, 463 N.E.2d 564, 569 (1984). 
4 See Moore v. Moore, 389 Mass. 21, 24-25, 448 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (1983). 
5 ld. at 24-25, 448 N.E.2d at 1247. 
6 See Knox, 371 Mass. at 435, 358 N.E.2d at 434-35. 
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are bound only to the judgment of divorce, which the court may modify 
upon the petition of either party. 7 
The principles , of contract law govern the validity of an agreement 
which the parties intend to survive a judgment of divorce, independent 
from the!terms of the divorce judgment.8 Both the superior court9 and 
the probate ~rt have jurisdiction to order specific performance of a 
contract. 10 G~nerally, Massachusetts courts will enforce separation agree-
ments that they find to be fair and reasonable at the time of the enforce-
ment proceedings, and free from fraud and coercion." In some cases, 
however, cou.ntervailing equities may demand a denial of specific enforce-
ment.12 . , ... , 
During the,.Survey year, the Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Cepek 
v. Cepek followed the general rule in Massachusetts that courts should 
enforce s~pa,~tion agreements which are fair and intended by the parties 
to survive a judgment of divorce. 13 The Cepek court applied this rule 
despite. ,the fact that the parties never presented their separation agree-
ment to the ,probate court during the divorce proceedings. 14 In addition, 
the court set forth guidelines for ordering specific performance, 15 includ-
ing the- .requirement that the court state with precision the lictions the 
defendant must take to comply with the agreement. 16 The Cepek decision 
reinforced the importance that divorcing parties clearly understand that 
separation agreements are final and enforceable as independent contrac-
tual obligations, distinct from the terms of divorce judgments providing 
for support and distribution of assets. 
In Cepek, the husband and wife executed a separation agreement dated 
April22, 1982. 17 The parties stipulated that the agreement be incorporated 
into any subsequent judgment for divorce. 18 Under the terms of the 
7 Jd. 
8 J. Harvey, E. Moriarty, M. Bryant, Massachusetts Domestic Relations, 1 The Practice 
Systems Library § 31.27 (1986). 
9 See Roberts-Neustadter Furs, Inc. v. Simon, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 270, 669 N.E.2d 
673 (1983), review denied, 391 Mass. 1102 (1984). 
10 G.L. c. 215 § 6, as appearing in St. 1973, c. 114 § 63; see Knox, 371 Mass. at 438, 358 
N.E.2d at 436. 
11 Moore, 389 Mass. at 24-25, 448 N.E.2d at 1257; Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 
514, 432 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1982); Knox, 37 Mass. at 436-37, 358 N.E.2d at 435-36. 
12 Knox, 37 Mass. at 437, 358 N.E.2d at 436. Such equities may include the likelihood 
that the dependent spouse might become a public charge, or a finding that the party seeking 
enforcement has violated the agreement. Jd. 
13 Cepek v. Cepek, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 333-34, 493 N.E.2d 881, 882-83 (1986). 
14 Jd. at 333, 493 N.E.2d at 882. 
15 Jd. at 335, 493 N.E.2d at 884. 
16 Jd. 
17 Jd. at 332, 335 n.10, 493 N.E.2d at 882, 884 n.10. 
18 Jd. at 332, 493 N.E.2d at 882. 
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agreement, the husband was to transfer his interest in the marital home 
to the wife. 19 The agreement, however, made no reference to compen-
sation for this transaction. 20 The separation agreement further provided 
that the husband designate the wife as the beneficiary of his Massachu-
setts Teacher's Retirement Fund account until the wife's remarriage. 21 
The agreement also required the husband to pay all of the children's 
educational expenses and all of the costs of residential utilities services. 22 
In September, 1983, a probate court granted the wife a divorce nisi 
from the husband under chapter 208, section J.23 The court's judgment 
ordered the husband to convey his interest in the home to the wife in 
return for a promissory note from the wife for $27,000.24 The judgment 
also provided for periodic support payments, but did not include a pro-
vision concerning the husband's retirement benefits. 25 At no time did 
either party present the agreement to the probate judge. 26 
In February, 1984, the wife filed a complaint in Superior Court for 
-Hampshire County seeking specific performance of the separation agree-
mentY She sought conveyance of the husband's interest in the house, 
and her designation as the beneficiary of his retirement fund. 28 The su-
perior court ordered that the husband comply with the terms of the 
separation agreement. 29 The husband appealed from this order, contend-
ing that the agreement was invalid because it had never been presented 
to the probate judge and had not been incorporated into the judgment. 30 
The Appeals Court affirmed the superior court judgment, with the mod-
ification that the superior court should have been more explicit in ordering 
specific performance of the agreement.3' 
In affirming the judgment, the court reasoned that because the terms 
of the separation agreement provided that it should survive regardless of 
whether it was incorporated into the judgment of divorce, the agreement 
was enforceable. 32 The court found no evidence that the failure to bring 
the agreement to the probate judge signified an understanding between 
19 /d. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. at 332 n.4, 493 N .E.2d at 882 n.4. 
23 /d. at 331, 333-34 n.6, 493 N.E.2d at 882, 883.n.6 (citing G.L. c. 208, § 1). 
24 Id. at 332, 493 N.E.2d at 882. 
25 /d. 
26 /d. at 333, 493 N.E.2d at 882. 
27 /d. at 332, 493 N.E.2d at 882. 
28 Id. at 333, 493 N.E.2d at 882. 
29 See id. 
3o Id. 
31 /d. at 335, 493 N.E.2d at 884. 
32 /d. at 333, 493 N.E.2d at 882. 
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the parties to rescind the separation agreement. 33 Further, the court found 
that a separation agreement may be specifically enforced at the time of 
the divorce judgment or at any later time. 34 
In specifically enforcing the agreement, the superior court had deter-
mined that it was fair and reasonable. 35 In the Appeals Court, the husband 
did not directly dispute this finding. 36 Instead, the husband's primary 
challenge to the validity of the separation agreement lay in his assertion 
that he would be relinquishing all substantive rights to his retirement 
funds by designating the wife as beneficiary of his retirement pension,37 
in violation of chapter 32, section 19 which makes invalid the assignment 
of such rights under state retirement systems. 38 The court found that 
specific performance of the agreement would not violate the statute be-
cause the agreement reasonably entitled the wife to survivorship rights 
only as a beneficiary of the husband's state pension,39 and thus, specific 
performance would not impair the defendant's pension benefits or elec-
tion of retirement benefits.40 The court determined that the substance of 
the husband's complaint, particularly, the husband's loss of rights to his 
retirement benefits, was insufficient to justify denial of enforceability of 
the agreement. 41 
The wife did not contest her obligation to pay the husband $27,000 in 
exchange for conveyance of his share of the marital home.42 Although 
the compensation from the wife was not included in the terms of the 
separation agreement, she did not dispute her obligation to make such 
payments as ordered by the judge in the judgment of divorce. 43 The court 
indicated in a footnote, however, that even if the wife had disputed her 
obligation to pay, a judge may condition enforcement orders to avoid 
inequity in specific performance.44 
Finally, although the Cepek court affirmed the superior court judgment, 
it criticized the superior court's lack of specificity in its order of specific 
33 Id. at 333, 493 N.E.2d at 883. 
34 Id. Under G.L. c. 208 § 1A as inserted by St. 1975, c. 698, § 2, a court's refusal to 
approve a separation agreement would render the agreement void. The Cepek action, 
however, was brought under G.L. c. 208, § 1 which does not include such a provision. Id. 
at 333-34 n.6, 493 N.E.2d at 883 n.6. 
"See Cepek, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 334, 493 N.E.2d at 883. 
36 ld. 
37 ld. 
38 G.L. c. 32, § 19. 
39 Cepek, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 334, 493 N.E.2d at 883. 
40 ld. 
4t Id. 
42 Id. at 334 n.7, 493 N.E.2d at 883 n.7. 
43 ld. 
44 ld. 
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enforcement. 45 Accordingly, the appeals court in Cepek reasoned that an 
order for specific enforcement must be "clear and unequivocal" so that 
it will not be questioned in the event of a subsequent action for con-
tempt. 46 The court found that a judgment of specific enforcement should 
indicate the "precise relief sought," and avoid any generalities or incor-
porations by reference of other documentsY 
Although the Cepek court accorded deference to parties' settlements 
of their own disputes, this is a relatively recent trend in Massachusetts 
case law.48 Previously, the statutory power of the court determining the 
rights and obligations of the parties was presumed superior to the parties' 
independent rights to make such determinations. 49 Recently, however, 
the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized a strong Massachusetts policy 
favoring enforcement of separation agreements voluntarily entered into 
by the parties to a divorce. 50 
Accordingly, courts will often imply the requisite intent of the parties 
to form a surviving contract absent specific language to the contrary.s' 
Under present law, if the parties' intention in entering a separation agree-
ment is that the agreement should survive the judgment of divorce, a 
probate court may neither modify the terms of the agreement, nor declare 
that it will not survive a divorce decree. 52 Where there is a valid sepa-
ration agreement, the court's ability to change the parties' circumstances 
is limited: it may modify its own judgment; it may refuse to incorporate 
the separation agreement into its judgment while still allowing the agree-
ment to be independently valid;53 or it may find that the agreement is 
unfair, unreasonable, fraudulent, or the result of coercion, and refuse 
specific enforcement. 54 
45 /d. at 335, 493 N.E.2d at 884. 
46Jd. 
47 /d. The husband also moved for a new trial on the basis of a second separation 
agreement containing different terms. /d. at 335, 493 N.E.2d at 883-84. The husband 
claimed to be under the impression that he and the wife were executing the second 
agreement when they were actually executing the agreement which the wife sought en-
forced. /d. The appeals court confirmed the lower court's denial of this motion, however, 
finding that the agreement cited by the husband was not written until after the agreement 
in question was executed. /d. 
48 See, Inker, Perocchi, & Walsh, Domestic Relations, 1977 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAW 
§ 1.1, at 6, (citing Knox, 371 Mass. 433, 358 N.E.2d 432). See also Stansel, 385 Mass. at 
512, 432 N.E.2d at 693. 
49 See, e.g., Stansel, 385 Mass. at 512, 432 N.E.2d at 693; Ryan v. Ryan, 371 Mass. at 
432, 358 N.E.2d at 432 (1976); J. LOMBARD, FAMILY LAW, 2 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES 
§ 1252 (1967). 
50 Moore, 389 Mass. at 24-25, 448 N.E.2d at 1257. 
51 See id. 
52 /d. at 23-25, 448 N.E.2d at 1257. 
53 /d. at 24-25, 448 N.E.2d at 1257. 
54 See id. 
19
Applebaum et al.: Chapter 4: Domestic Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1986
118 1986 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 4.3 
The court does have discretion to give consideration to the agreement 
in fashioning a judgment or a modification of a judgment. 55 The court 
may also contradict the terms of the separation agreement,56 provided 
that it does not presume to actually modify the agreementY For example, 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Knox v. Remick determined that a probate 
judge may order that a spouse pay less money than was agreed to in the 
separation agreement. 58 The court acknowledged, however, that the 
spouse receiving the reduced amount is entitled to recover the difference 
in a contract action. 59 The reduced judgment's only effect, then, is to 
reduce the amount for which the obligated spouse will be liable for 
contempt on non-payment of the amount. 60 
It must be noted that the result in Cepek would have been different 
had the divorce been filed under chapter 208, section lA, the statute 
providing for no-fault divorce.61 Section lA requires the parties to present 
a separation agreement to the probate judge prior to the judgment for 
divorce.62 Consequently, the failure of the court to approve and incor-
porate an agreement would render it void between the parties.63 Under 
section lA, even though an agreement must be incorporated into the 
judgment, the parties may provide that the agreement is to survive the 
divorcejudgment.64 In contrast, a divorce filed under chapter 208, section 
1, as in Cepek, requires no court approval of separation agreements.65 
After Cepek, divorcing parties should be aware that judicial approval 
of an agreement is only required under section 1A.66 Accordingly, the 
failure of parties to present a separation agreement to the probate court 
in a fault-based divorce action will not discharge the agreement. 67 In 
55 See Knox, 37 Mass. at 435, 358 N.E.2d at 435. 
56 /d. at 435, 358 N.E.2d at 435. 
51 See Moore, 389 Mass. at 24, 448 N.E.2d at 1257. 
58 Knox, 37 Mass. at 435, 358 N.E.2d at 435. 
59 ld. 
&J ld. 
61 G.L. c. 208, § IA. The Cepek court acknowledged this distinction at 33 Mass. App. 
Ct. 333 n.6, 493 N.E.2d 883 n.6. 
62 G.L. c. 208, § IA provides, in part, that an action for divorce will begin when, among 
other things, "a notarized separation agreement executed by the parties" is filed. Such 
agreements may also be filed within 90 days of the commencement of the action. I d. 
63 G.L. c. 208, § IA. Under the statute, if the court does not approve the agreement, "it 
shall become null and void and of no further effect between then parties; and the action 
shall be treated as dismissed .... " I d. 
64 /d. "The agreement either shall be incorporated and merged into [the] judgment or by 
agreement of the parties, it shall be incorporated and not merged, but shall survive as an 
independent contract." ld. 
65 G.L. c. 208, § 1. 
66 See supra text and accompanying notes 61-65 for language of related statutes. 
67 Cepek, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 333, 335, 493 N.E.2d at 883. 
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order to assure that a divorce decree is consistent with a separation 
agreement, the parties to a fault-based divorce should be certain to 
present any valid, existing agreement to the court prior to judgment. 
The Cepek court also directed that parties ordered to comply with 
separation agreements be instructed specifically as to their obligations 
under the agreement. 68 Further, the court noted that even in the divorce 
context a judge ordering specific performance may "condition the en-
forcement order to avoid inequity. "69 Therefore, in arguing for specific 
performance, the practitioner may wish to refer specifically to the precise 
relief he or she seeks, in order to aid the judge in structuring his or her 
order. 
The Cepek court reinforced the premium placed on the contractual 
rights of divorcing parties who have chosen to enter separation agree-
ments by affirming the enforcement of a separation agreement which had 
never been brought before the probate court. 70 The Cepek decision also 
highlights a practitioner's need for caution in advising clients entering 
separation agreements. A client should consider whether it is desirable 
for a separation agreement to survive a judgment and continue in force 
regardless of judicial acceptance of the agreement, or whether it is pref-
erable to have a judge specifically approve the agreement in his order. 
As a result of the Massachusetts Appeals Court's decision in Cepek, the 
practitioner should be aware, that where a divorce is not brought under 
the no-fault statute, any valid separation agreement intended to survive 
a judgment will be specifically enforced regardless of whether it was 
presented to the probate judge prior to the judgment of divorce. 
§ 4.4. The Admissibility of HLA Testing in Paternity Suits.* Courts and 
legislatures traditionally have viewed paternity testing as a means to 
conclusively exclude the paternity of the father. 1 Under this view, evi-
dence provided by paternity tests establishing to a medical certainty the 
nonpaternity of an accused father is admissable for exculpatory pur-
68 /d. at 335, 493 N.E.2d at 884. 
69 See id. at 334 n.7, 493 N.E.2d at 883 n.7. In drawing this conclusion, the court relied 
on Roberts-Neustadter Furs, Inc. v. Simon, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 270-71, 457 N.E.2d at 
673-74, a case involving specific performance of an option to purchase leased premises. 
70 See supra text accompanying notes 50-52. 
*Christopher D. Dillon, staff membe't, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.4. 'See, e.g., Symonds v. Symonds, 385 Mass. 540, 432 N.E.2d 700 (1982); Com-
monwealth v. D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642, 162 N.E.2d 19 (1959); Ross v. Marx, 24 N.J. Super. 
25, 93 A.2d 597 (App. Div. 1952); State ex rei. Freeman v. Morris, 156 Ohio St. 333, 102 
N.E.2d 450 (1951); Commonwealth v. Dean, 172 Pa. Super. 415, 94 A.2d 59 (1953). See 
generally J. LOMBARD, FAMILY LAW, 1 MASS. PRACTICE SERfES § 691-93 (1967) (sum-
marizing state statutes and significant case law addressing the admissibility of blood group-
ing tests as a means of exonerating alleged fathers as true fathers). 
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poses. 2 Massachusetts, and other jurisdictions, have enacted statutes 
which permit the use of such evidence solely to exclude the possibility 
of paternity.3 Chapter 273, section 12A, admits into evidence the results 
of "blood grouping tests" only when the definite nonpaternity of the father 
is established. 4 
The enactment of chapter 273, commonly referred to as an exclusionary 
blood test statute, occurred when paternity testing techniques were lim-
ited to tests which examined red blood cells.5 At that time, two blood 
grouping tests, the Landsteiner series and the enhanced Landsteiner 
series generally were used to disprove a putative father's paternity.6 
Subsequent to the enactment of chapter 273, the human leukocyte antigen 
(HLA) test was developed and became a highly reliable means of patern-
ity testing. 7 
The HLA test differs from the blood grouping tests as it identifies 
specific characteristics of white blood cells and can be performed not 
only on blood but on certain body tissue. 8 HLA testing is significantly 
2 See J. LOMBARD, supra note I, § 691 for discussion of the use of paternity tests to 
exclude an accused father. 
3 See, e.g., Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 880-82, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865, 868-
69, (1979) (court interprets Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity); Cutch-
ember v. Payne, 466 A.2d 1240, 1241-42 (D.C. 1983) (court interprets District of Columbia's 
exclusionary statute for definition of "blood test"); Pizana v. Jones, 127 Mich. App. I, 2-
3, 339 N.W.2d 123, 127-128 (1983) (court interprets Michigan paternity statute). 
4 G.L. c. 273 § 12A states: 
!d. 
In any proceeding to determine the question of paternity, the court, on motion of 
the alleged father, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit 
to one or more blood grouping tests, to be made by a duly qualified physician or 
other duly qualified person, designated by the court, to determine whether or not 
the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of the child. The results of 
such tests shall be admissible in evidence only in cases where definite exclusion of 
the alleged father as such father has been established. If one of the parties refuses 
to comply with the order of the court relative to such tests, such fact shall be 
admissible in evidence in such proceeding unless the court, for good cause, otherwise 
orders. 
5 Chapter 273 was orginally enacted as G.L. c. 232 in 1954. See infra notes 6-7 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the development of paternity testing techniques. 
6 See Lemmon & Murphy, The Evidentiary Use of the HLA Blood Test· in Virginia, 19 
U. RICH. L. REV. 235, 236-39 (1985). 
7 See Terasaki, Resolution By HLA Testing Of 1,000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded By 
ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543, 544 (1978) (HLA testing was used to a limited extent in 
the United States during the 1970's); Ellman and Kaye, Probabilities and Proof· Can HLA 
Testing and Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131, 1139-40 
(1979) [hereinafter Ellman and Kaye] (HLA testing excludes a high proportion of falsely 
accused defendants). 
8 Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Dis-
puted Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 272-76 (1976) [hereinafter Joint Guidelines]. 
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more accurate than blood grouping tests in two ways. First, the HLA 
test more comprehensively excludes nonfathers than do the blood group-
ing tests. 9 In fact, HLA testing, in conjunction with the enhanced Land-
steiner series, increases the probability of excluding nonfathers to over 
90%. 10 Second, the HLA test, as a result of its greater ability to exclude 
nonfathers, produces inculpatory evidence by which a statistical esti-
mation of the alleged father's likelihood of paternity may be calculated. 11 
The probability of paternity indicates the likelihood that the alleged father 
is the true father when measured against the other men who are not 
excluded from paternity. 12 That is, the HLA test can determine the 
possibility of paternity by segregating men who possess the necessary 
trait identifiable in the child's body tissue. 
Experts calculate the probability of paternity through the use of Bayes 
Theorem. Bayes Theorem is a formula that introduces new variables to 
change a prior probability that a given hypothesis is true. 13 In paternity 
testing, a prior probability that the alleged father is the true father is 
changed by introducing other evidence such as blood types of the alleged 
father and child. 14 Many courts assume that the alleged father has a 50% 
probability of being the true father. 15 That is, the alleged father is as 
likely to have been the true father as a randomly selected nonexcluded 
male. Evidence such as blood type is then weighed to change this prior 
probability that the accused is the true father. 16 A 90% probability of 
paternity, therefore, indicates that an alleged father has a 90% chance of 
being the true father based on a prior probability of being the true father 
altered by the introduction of new evidence such as the blood types of 
the father and child. 17 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth 
v. Beausoleil addressed the admissibility of HLA test results which do 
9 /d. Both HLA tests and blood grouping tests yield the probability of exclusion. Peterson, 
A Few Things You Should Know About Paternity Tests (But Were Afraid To Ask), 22 SANTA 
CLARA L. REv. 667, 677-81 (1982) [hereinafter Peterson). That is, the percentage chance 
that a nonfather is excluded by a test or series of tests. ld. at 677. A 90% exclusion 
probability means that there is a 90% chance that the test or series of tests performed 
excludes a wrongly accused father. /d. Alternatively stated, the accused father, if not 
coriclusively excluded, falls within the tenth percentile of the male population having the 
necessary trait to be the true father. The enhanced Landsteiner series yields a probability 
of exclusion of a nonfather between 63% and 72%. Joint Guidelines, supra note 8, at 256. 
10 Joint Guidelines, supra note 8, at 257-58. 
11 See Peterson, supra note 9, at 681-702 for a discussion of the probability of paternity. 
"/d. 
13 /d. 
14Jd. 
15 Ellman and Kaye, supra note 7, at 1150 n.93. 
16 /d. at 1147-50. 
17 /d. at 1149. 
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not exculpate the alleged father. In addition, the Court addressed whether 
inculpatory HLA test results are sufficiently reliable to be admitted as 
scientific evidence. 18 In Beausoleil, the Court concluded, as other juris-
dictions have, that the exclusionary blood test statute, chapter 273, did 
not prohibit the introduction of inculpatory HLA test results. 19 The 
Court, moreover, held that inculpatory HLA tests are sufficiently reliable 
to be admissible as scientific evidence. 20 The Court limited its holding, 
however, by announcing guidelines for the affirmative use of HLA test 
results. 21 
In Beausoleil, Sharon Burke, using blood test results falling outside 
the scope of chapter 273, section 12A, accused Michael Beausoleil of 
fathering her child. 22 The defendant requested that the trial court order 
the plaintiff, the child and himself to undergo an HLA test to establish 
his nonpaternity. 23 The trial judge assented to the request but refused to 
admit the results of the HLA test as they did not exculpate the defen-
dant. 24 The trial judge found the defendant guilty and entered an order 
requiring the defendant to pay child support. 25 The defendant appealed 
the decision. 26 Prior to a new trial, however, the Commonwealth filed a 
motion in limine asking that the results of the HLA test be introduced 
into evidence ,27 The trial judge denied the Commonwealth's motion, and 
the Commonwealth appealed the denial. 28 Due to the pendency of the 
numerous paternity suits raising issues concerning HLA test results, the 
Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own motion. 29 
The Beausoleil Court first confronted the threshold issue of whether 
chapter 273, section 12A, the exclusionary blood test statute, prohibited 
the introduction of the inculpatory HLA test results. 30 The Court noted 
18 Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 397 Mass. 206, 208, 490 N.E.2d 788, 790 (1986). 
19 ld. at 213, 490 N.E.2d at' 793. For similar decisions in other jurisdictions see, e.g., 
Crain v. Crain, 104 Idaho 666, 671-73, 662 P.2d 538, 543-44 (1983); Callison v. Callison, 
687 P.2d 106, 110 (Okla. 1984); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980); Cramer 
v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 880-82, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865, 868-69 (1979). 
20 Beausoleil, 397 Mass. at 215, 490 N.E.2d at 794. For similar conclusions reached in 
other states see, e.g., Perry v. Commonwealth ex rei. Kessinger, 652 S.W.2d 655, 661 (Ky. 
1983); Imms v. Clarke, 654 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Mo. App. 1983). 
21 Beausoleil, 397 Mass. at 217, 490 N.E.2d at 795. 
22 ld. at 207, 490 N.E.2d at 789. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a description 
of G .L. c. 273, § 12A. 
23 Id. at 207, 490 N.E.2d at 789-90. 
24 Id. at 207, 490 N.E.2d at 790. 
25 ld. 
26 ld. 
27 ld. 
28 Id. at 207-08, 490 N.E.2d at 790. 
29 Id. at 208, 490 N.E.2d at 790. 
30 Id. at 211, 490 N.E.2d at 792. 
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that the statute refers to "blood grouping tests" and that the HLA test is 
a tissue typing procedure. 31 As a result, the Court concluded that the 
HLA test falls beyond the plain meaning of the language in the statute, 
and HLA test results, therefore, are not excluded by section 12A.32 The 
Court further supported its conclusion by recognizing that the HLA test 
had not been developed at the time of the enactment of chapter 273 in 
1954.33 The Court reasoned that the Legislature could not have intended 
to prevent the introduction of paternity evidence produced by tests that 
were not yet known. 34 Thus, the Court held that the statute did not 
specifically bar HLA test results from admission. 35 
Because chapter 273, section 12A did not prohibit HLA test results as 
inculpatory evidence, the Court next examined HLA testing under the 
general guidelines applicable to the admission of scientific evidence.36 
The Court noted that for a scientific test or theory, such as HLA test 
results, to be admitted as scientific evidence there must be general ac-
ceptance of the test or theory in the scientific community.J? The Court, 
citing some of its prior decisions in this area, concluded that once accep-
tance by the scientific community is established, the evidentiary benefits 
of the scientific theory or test should be accepted. 38 Because the issue of 
whether the reliability of HLA tests has been accepted by the scientific 
community had come to the Court through a motion in limine and the 
trial record lacked any expert testimony, the Court relied on authority 
from other jurisdictions and articles concerning HLA paternity testing to 
reach its conclusion.39 Upon a review of these sources, the Court con-
cluded that HLA test results are generally accepted in the scientific 
community as reliable.40 As a result of this general acceptance of reli-
ability, the Court held that HLA test results should be admissible as 
inculpatory evidence.41 
The Beausoleil Court, however, narrowed its holding by adopting lim-
itations on the use of inculpatory HLA test results. The Court first 
31 Id. at 212, 490 N.E.2d at 792. 
32 Id. at 212-13, 490 N.E.2d at 793. 
33 Id. at 213, 490 N.E.2d at 793. 
34 Jd. 
35 ld. 
36 /d. at 214, 490 N.E.2d at 793. 
37 Id. The Court used the standard of admissibility for scientific evidence established in 
Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
38 Beausoleil, 397 Mass. at 214-15, 490 N.E.2d at 793-94; Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 
Mass. 426, 381 N.E.2d 582 (1978); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 313 
N.E.2d 120 (1974); Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 185 N.E.2d 754 (1962). 
39 Beausoleil, 397 Mass. at 215, 490 N.E.2d at 794. 
40 !d. at 216, 490 N.E.2d at 794. 
41 Id. at 217, 490 N.E.2d at 795. 
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annuciated a preference for expressing HLA test results as a probability 
of paternity rather than as a probability of exclusion.42 The Court noted 
that both probabilities are relevant to the issue of paternity; however, it 
found that the exclusion probability would unneccesarily mislead ajury.43 
The Court noted, as an example, that a jury may erroneously believe 
that a relationship exists between the inculpatory exclusion probability, 
indicating that the alleged father belongs to the small percentage of men 
who possess the necessary trait to be the father and the likelihood of 
paternity when no such relationship does actually exist.44 The possibility 
of creating confusion for the factfinder, the Court concluded, is too great 
to warrant the use of the exclusion probability. The Court particularly 
stressed the disadvantage of using the exclusion probability when a more 
meaningful statistic, such as the probability of the accused father's like-
lihood of paternity, is available.45 
Next, in an attempt to prevent the presentation to a jury of a statisti-
cally insignificant probability, the Court concluded that the inculpatory 
evidence should be presented to the jury only when the probability of 
the alleged father's paternity is 95% or more.46 Furthermore, the Court 
held that a probability of paternity which equals or exceeds 95% is not 
conclusive on the issue of paternity. 47 Rather, the Court emphasized that 
the probability of paternity is only one factor of many which the jury 
may base its decision. 48 Thus, the Court noted that the factfinder may, 
and should, consider other evidence such as whether the putative father 
ever had intercourse with the mother. 49 
Finally, the Court recognized the necessity that counsel lay a proper 
foundation for admitting the HLA test as scientific evidence. 50 The Court 
42Jd. 
43Jd. 
44 The Court noted that although the exclusion probability tells the jury that the alleged 
father falls within the small percent of men who could have fathered the child "it does 
nothing to distinguish the true father from perhaps millions of men who fall into this group." 
/d. (quoting Peterson, supra note 9, at 680). 
45 See id. at 217-18, 490 N.E.2d at 795-96. 
46 /d. at 218-19, 490 N.E.2d at 796. The Court noted a further aspect of this limitation 
and concluded that a jury may be presented with the probability of paternity only when a 
blood group test and HLA test yields an exclusion probability of at least 90% of the 
nonfathers tested. /d. at 218, 490 N.E.2d at 796. The current practice, the Court noted, is 
to administer an HLA test with the enhanced Landsteiner series. /d. at 218 n.16, 490 
N.E.2d at 796 n.l6. 
47 /d. at 219, 490 N.E.2d at 796. 
48 /d. at 219-20, 490 N.E.2d at 796-97. 
49 /d. at 220, 490 N.E.2d at 797. 
50 /d. at 220-21, 490 N.E.2d at 797. The Court, as an additional protection, suggested 
that the judge, if requested, should instruct the jury to ignore inculpatory HLA test results 
if there is no evidence that intercourse between the alleged father and mother took place. 
/d. at 220 n.18, 490 N .E.2d at 797 n.18. 
26
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1986 [1986], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1986/iss1/7
§ 4.4 DOMESTIC RELATIONS 125 
specifically stressed the qualifications of expert witnesses and the em-
ployment of proper testing procedures. 51 The Court concluded that in-
culpatory HLA test evidence, as with similar scientific evidence, is ad-
missible only when developed by proper testing procedures and 
introduced through competent witnesses. 52 
The Beausoleil Court, in sum, held that chapter 273, section 12A does 
not bar the introduction of inculpatory HLA test results. Moreover, the 
Court concluded that HLA test results are sufficiently reliable to meet 
the standard of admissibility for scientific evidence. The Court, however, 
tempered its holding by adopting limitations concerning the presentation 
and weight of the evidence developed by HLA test results. 53 
Justice O'Connor concurred with the result of the majority's opinion 
but differed from the majority's blanket allowance of the introduction of 
the probability of paternity when it meets the 95% threshhold. 54 Justice 
O'Connor noted that the majority assumed, in its calculation of the 
probability of paternity, that the alleged father had intercourse with the 
mother.55 Justice O'Connor argued that, as a prior condition to the use 
of the probability in evidence, it should be determined that the alleged 
father and mother had intercourse in circumstances in which conception 
of the child was possible.56 Use of the probability of paternity, without 
a prior finding of intercourse, Justice O'Connor reasoned, would erro-
neously sway a jury which could not be expected to ignore the introduced 
probability of paternity even in a situation where there was no evidence 
that intercourse occurred.57 The Justice, in short, advocated a two step 
presentation of evidence to establish paternity. First, in Justice O'Con-
nor's view, adequate evidence finding that intercourse occurred between 
51 Id. at 220-21, 490 N.E.2d at 797-98. 
52 Id. at 220, 490 N.E.2d at 797-98. 
53 The Court also considered, albeit briefly, the defendant's claims that the court's re-
quiring of HLA blood testing violated his fourth and fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 222-
23, 490 N.E.2d at 798-99. The Court, analogizing from Schmerber v. California, concluded 
that the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment and right 
against unreasonable search and seizures under the fourth amendment were not violated. 
Beausoleil, 397 Mass. at 222-23, 490 N.E.2d at 798-99 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 
u.s. 757, 766-72 (1966)). 
"Id. at 224-25, 490 N.E.2d at 799-800 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
55 Id. at 225, 490 N.E.2d at 800. 
56 Jd. at 227-28, 490 N.E.2d at 801. 
51 Jd. at 228, 490 N.E.2d at 801. Justice O'Connor expressed concern that even if the 
Judge instructed the jury to ignore the HLA test results in deciding whether intercourse 
ever occurred between the alleged father and mother, the jury would invariably consider 
the evidence in assessing the occurrence of intercourse. I d. The Justice acknowleged that 
the majority was sensitive to the problem but concluded that it did not adequately solve it. 
I d. 
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the alleged father and mother is necessary. 58 If that condition is met, 
Justi~e O'Connor then would allow the introduction of the probability of 
paternity. 59 This bifurcated approach, the Justice concluded, would allow 
the jury to consider only highly probative evidence regarding paternity.60 
The majority of the Beausoleil Court reached what appears to be a 
reasonable and cautious approach to the use of evidence developed by 
HLA tests in paternity disputes. The Court attempted to balance the 
usefulness of scientific evidence in ascertaining the validity of the pa-
ternity allegations with the need to ensure the reliability and proper 
presentation of the evidence. Despite its laudable intentions, however, 
the Court allowed the introduction of evidence - the probabilty of 
paternity - which may mislead a factfinder. 
The calculation of the probability of paternity, as noted above, is 
derived from an application of Bayes Theorem which changes a prior 
probability of an hypothesis upon additional evidence. 61 The Court ex-
pressly acknowledged the use of Bayes Theorem and, in a somewhat 
cavalier manner, impliedly adopted the general practice of assuming a 
50% prior probability.62 Such an assumption is unwarranted as it broadly 
assumes that the alleged father and a randomly selected man both have 
equal chances of being the true father. Implicit in this broad assumption 
is the underlying assumption that both men had intercourse with the 
mother under similar circumstances in terms of frequency, fertility, timing 
and use of birth control.63 It is unrealistic to expect that these assumptions 
can possibly be valid. 
This problem of assuming too much can be alleviated by an approach 
similar to that proposed by Justice O'Connor.64 The evidence relating to 
the prior probability - the frequency of intercourse, use of birth control, 
fertility and timing of intercourse - should first be weighed by the 
factfinder. If the factfinder concludes that intercourse did occur, then it 
may analyze the probability of paternity. Moreover, the evidential factors 
noted above should be used to arrive at a realistic assessment of the prior 
probability of paternity.65 For instance, if it is clear from the evidence 
presented that the alleged father had frequent intercourse with the mother 
without the use of birth control techniques, the prior probability may be 
58 /d. at 229, 490 N.E.2d at 802. 
59 /d. 
«J /d. 
61 See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the probability of 
paternity. 
62 See id. at 211 n.6, 490 N.E.2d at 792 n.6. 
63 See Peterson, supra note 9, at 685. 
64 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence. 
65 See Ellman and Kaye, supra note 7, at 1152-53. 
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assessed at greater than 50%. It is reasonable to conclude that the alleged 
father under such circumstances has a greater chance of being the true 
father than does a randomly selected man. Recalculation of the proba-
bility of paternity using a prior probability estimated on the facts and 
circumstances of the individual case therefore results in a statistic more 
useful than one based on an assumed 50% prior probability. Ignoring 
applicable evidence relating to the prior probability of paternity tarnishes 
the usefulness of otherwise probative scientific evidence.66 
In Beausoleil, the Supreme Judicial Court expressly permitted the use 
of inculpatory evidence derived from an HLA test. In an effort to prevent 
confusion which may result from the introduction of complicated scien-
tific evidence, the Court enumerated guidelines for the presentation, 
introduction and use by the factfinder of the evidence. The Court, un-
fortunately, failed to ensure that the evidence was particularly significant 
by assuming critical facts in the calculation of the probability of paternity. 
This shortcoming may be cured in the future by examining evidence 
relating to the underlying assumptions and adjusting the prior probability 
accordingly prior to calculating the probability of paternity. 
§ 4.5. Authority of Juvenile Courts to Order Parents to Submit to In-
Home Investigations by the Department of Social Services of Alleged Child 
Abuse.* In 1973, the Massachusetts legislature enacted sections 51 A 
through 51F of chapter 119 of the General Laws. 1 These sections establish 
the procedures and the powers of the Department of Social Services 
(DSS) when dealing with physically and emotionally injured children. 
Under section 51A, any medical personnel, teacher, social worker, or 
other government official who, in his or her professional capacity, has 
reason to believe that a minor is physically or emotionally injured, must 
report that injury to the DSS. 2 In addition, any other person who has 
66 The recalculation of the probability of paternity incorporating the factfinder's estimate 
of the prior probability adds complexity to the process and may cause confusion, particu-
larly in jury trials. To alleviate this concern, Professors Ellman and Kaye propose a general 
approach. They recommend that the experts testifying present a chart showing a range of 
hypothetical prior probabilities and the associated subsequent probability of paternity. See 
Ellman and Kaye, supra note 7, at 1152-61. 
*Mark D. Lurie, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.5. 1 See annotations to G.L. c. 119 §§ 51A-F. 
2 G.L. c. 119A, § 51A. Section 51A provides, in relevant part: 
Any physician, medical intern, hospital personnel engaged in the examination, 
care or treatment of persons, medical examiner, psychologist, emergency medical 
technician, dentist, nurse, ... public or private school teacher, educational admin-
istrator, guidance or family counselor, ... who, in his professional capacity shall 
have reasonable cause to believe that a child under the age of eighteen years is 
suffering serious physical or emotional injury resulting from abuse inflicted upon 
him including sexual abuse, ... shall immediately report such condition to the 
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reasonable cause to believe that a child is abused may make a report to 
the DSS.3 Upon receiving a report of abuse, the DSS must investigate 
and evaluate the reported information. 4 The DSS must take the child into 
temporary custody if it has reason to believe that removal is necessary 
to protect the child,5 and must inform the district attorney if the child 
has died, been sexually assaulted or exploited, or has suffered serious 
bodily injury.6 The DSS investigation must include a visit to the minor's 
home, if appropriate. 7 
During the Survey year, in Parents of Two Minors v. Bristol Division 
of the Juvenile Court Department, the Supreme Judical Court held that 
a judge of a juvenile court does not have authority to order parents of a 
minor to submit to a nonemergency home visit by the DSS when inves-
tigating an anonymous child abuse report. 8 In reaching this decision, the 
Court reasoned that neither statute nor common law granted the judge 
the authority to order the parents to comply with a DSS nonemergency 
investigation.9 The Court did not reach any issues of unconstitutional 
searches. 10 
On May 8, 1985, the DSS "Child Abuse Hot-Line" received an anon-
ymous telephone call claiming that the plaintiffs abused their children, a 
/d. 
department by oral communication and by making a written report within forty-eight 
hours after such oral communication . . . . 
3 /d. ("In addition to those persons required to report pursuant to this section, any other 
person may make such a report if any such person has reasonable cause to believe that a 
child is suffering from or has died as a result of such abuse or neglect.") 
4 G.L. c. 119 § 518. Section 518 provides, in relevant part: 
/d. 
The department shall -
(l) investigate and evaluate the information reported under section fifty-one A. 
Said investigation and evaluation shall commence within two hours of initial contact 
and be completed within twenty-four hours if the department has reasonable cause 
to believe the child's health or safety is in immediate danger from further abuse or 
neglect. Said investigation and evaluation shall commence within two working days 
of initial contact and be completed within ten calendar days for all other such reports. 
5 G.L. c. 119 § 518(3). 
6 G.L. c. 119 § 518(4). 
7 G.L. c. 119 § 518(1). Section 518 also provides that: 
/d. 
[t]he investigation shall include a home visit at which the child is viewed, if appro-
priate, a determination of the nature, extent and cause or causes of the injuries, the 
identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, the name, age and condition 
of other children in the same household, an evaluation of the parents and the home 
environment, and all other pertinent facts or matters. 
8 397 Mass. 846, 847, 494 N.E.2d 1306, 1307--08 (1986). 
9 /d. at 852-53, 45/4 N.E.2d at 1311. 
'
0 /d. at 848, 494 N.E.2d at 1308. 
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five year old boy and a six year old girl. 11 The caller stated that she had 
been in close contact with the plaintiffs for four years, and that on many 
occasions she noticed bruises on the children, allegedly caused by pa-
rental abuse. 12 A DSS investigator attempted to substantiate the allega-
tions by visiting the plaintiffs' home, but the plaintiffs, with their attor-
ney's advice, refused to allow the investigator entry into their home. 13 
On May 15, 1985, the DSS petitioned the juvenile court to order the 
plaintiffs to allow the investigator into their house. 14 The judge granted 
DSS' s petition, reasoning that the DSS has a ~'plain right" to investigate. 15 
The following day the plaintiffs appealed directly, under section 3 of 
chapter 211, 16 to the Supreme Judicial Court to quash the juvenile court's 
orderY A single justice, without opinion, denied the plaintiffs' petition. 18 
Plaintiffs then appealed to the full Court. 19 
Two DSS employees went to the plaintiffs' home on May 31, 1985, 
spoke with the children, and concluded the investigation.20 On September 
6, 1985, the DSS requested the Court to dismiss the plaintiffs' petition 
for mootness. 21 In addition, the DSS argued that the plaintiffs' direct 
appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court was inappropriate. 22 The parents 
of the minors claimed that the juvenile court judge was not authorized 
to order entry of their house,23 and that the entry violated the fourth 
amendment of the United States Constitution,24 as well as article fourteen 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 25 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected both the mootness and propriety 
of direct appeals arguments of the DSS.26 Further, the Court did not 
11 /d. at 847, 494 N.E.2d at 1308. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. 
15 /d. at 847-48, 494 N.E.2d at 1308. 
16 Section 3 states that "(t]he supreme judicial court shall have general superintendence 
of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if no 
other remedy is expressly provided .... " G.L. c. 211 § 3. 
17 Parents of Two Minors, 397 Mass. at 848, 494 N.E.2d at 1308. 
18 /d. 
19 /d. 
2fJ /d. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. The fourth amendment states that "(t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated .... "U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
25 Parents of Two Minors, 397 Mass. at 848, 494 N.E.2d at 1308. According to article 14, 
"(e)very subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of 
his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions." MASS. CoNST. pt. I, art. XIV. 
26 Parents of Two Minors, 397 Mass. 849-51,494 N.E.2d at 1309-10. 
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reach the merits of the plaintiffs' constitutional claimsY Instead, the 
Court ruled that the juvenile court judge exceeded his authority when he 
issued the order allowing the DSS investigators into the plaintiffs' home. 28 
The Parents of Two Minors Court first considered the defendant's 
argument that the case was mooted when the DSS completed its inves-
tigation, thereby eliminating the parties' stake in the outcome of the 
litigation. 29 The Court rejected this argument, noting that where there is 
an issue. of public importance that is likely to arise again under similar 
circumstances, a court may decide a moot case. 30 Thus, the Court re-
jected the argument of mootness, the DSS's first procedural defense. 
The Parents of Two Minors Court similarly rejected the defendant's 
second procedural argument, that the plaintiffs should have proceeded 
through normal appellate review, rather than seek the supervisory power 
27 /d. at 848, 494 N.E.2d at 1308. The Court did suggest, in dicta, however, that the 
legislature might enact a statute permitting juvenile courts to order parents to allow entry 
by DSS employees which, if properly drawn, could withstand constitutional attacks. /d. at 
852,494 N.E.2d at 1311. 
28 /d. at 848, 494 N.E.2d at 1308. 
29 /d. at 849, 494 N.E.2d at 1309. Courts generally refuse to hear moot cases for several 
reasons. First, only concrete disputes can be resolved through adversary proceedings. Wolf 
v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293, 298, 327 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1975). Further, if 
the parties do not have a stake in the outcome, they may not argue their positions stren-
uously. /d. In addition, judicial resolution of hypothetical disputes would encroach upon 
the legislative domain. /d. Finally, the judiciary should spend its time resolving true con-
flicts, not "insubstantial controversies." /d. 
30 Parents of Two Minors, 397 Mass. at 849, 494 N.E.2d at 1309. In Lockhart v. Attorney 
General, 390 Mass. 780, 459 N.E.2d 813 (1984), the Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that 
it could answer a moot question when certain factors are present. First, the Court remarked, 
the issue before the court must be one of public importance. Lockhart, 390 Mass. at 783, 
459 N.E.2d at 815. In addition, the Court noted, the issue must be fully argued by both 
sides. /d. Moreover, the Court reasoned, it must be very likely, if not certain, that the 
issue would again arise under a similar set of circumstances. /d. Finally, the Court noted 
that it would address moot issues when it is likely that, in subsequent cases, appellate 
review could not be obtained before the issue again became moot. /d. Thus, where a case 
is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," a court is more likely to consider moot 
issues. /d. (quoting Wolf, 367 Mass. at 298, 327 N.E.2d at 889). The Lockhart Court 
observed, however, that the Supreme Judicial Court has never decided a moot case where 
the issue concerned a constitutional question, consistent with "judicial restraint" and the 
tradition of not unnecessarily deciding constitutional issues. /d. at 784, 459 N.E.2d at 816. 
The Court, in Parents of Two Minors, held that the conditions enumerated in Lockhart 
were present, and therefore refused to dismiss the case as moot. Parents of Two Minors, 
397 Mass. at 849, 494 N.E.2d at 1309. Additionally, the Court reasoned that its refusal to 
dismiss did not violate the traditional restraint on answering moot constitutional questions 
because the Court did not reach the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments. Id. at 849 n.2, 494 
N.E.2d at 1309 n.2. The Court's decision was based, instead, on statutory interpretation 
and determination of the limits of juvenile court authority. See id. at 849-53, 494 N .E.2d 
at 1309-11. 
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of the Supreme Judicial Court under section 3 of chapter 21 t.31 The DSS 
observed that the Supreme Judicial Court had previously refused to 
consider direct appeals from interlocutory discovery orders. 32 Rather 
than directly appeal the juvenile court's order, the DSS argued, the 
parents of the two minors should have refused the order, incurred a ruling 
of contempt, and then appealed the contempt order. 33 
Rejecting this argument, however, the Court reasoned that the present 
case was distinguishable from interlocutory discovery orders. 34 The Court 
observed that direct appeals from interlocutory orders are rejected be-
cause such appeals tend to disrupt the progress of ongoing litigation. 35 
The Court stated that the parents objected to a final order, and therefore 
no reason existed for requiring the plaintiffs to invite an order of contempt 
in order to obtain review. 36 
In addition, the Parents of Two Minors Court noted that because no 
statute provides for appellate review in cases of DSS child abuse inves-
tigation, the exercise of supervisory power by the Supreme Judicial Court 
would be the plaintiffs' only remedyY The Court thus distinguished 
statutory provisions regarding child abuse from provisions concerning 
adjudication that a minor is in need of services,38 or of care and protec-
tion,39 or that the child is a delinquent,40 all of which do provide expressly 
for right of appeal. 41 Consequently, the Court held that direct appellate 
review was appropriate because no other appellate review is provided in 
the statute, and there was no reason to require the plaintiffs to be ad-
judged in contempt in order to appeal. 
31 Id. at 849-51, 494 N.E.2d at 1309-10. See supra note 16 for text of section 3. 
32 Parents of Two Minors, 397 Mass. at 850, 494 N.E.2d at 1309 (citing Cronin v. Strayer, 
392 Mass. 525, 529, 467 N.E.2d 143, 146 (1984) (nonparty witnesses have no right to direct 
appeal of order requiring them to submit to discovery). 
33 !d. See also Cronin, 392 Mass. at 529, 467 N.E.2d at 146 ("The appellants assert that 
we should permit this appeal because no legitimate purpose is served by requiring witnesses 
to invite contempt in order to obtain appellate review. We do not agree."). 
34 Parents of Two Minors, 397 Mass. at 851,494 N.E.2d at 1310. 
35 Id. at 850, 494 N.E.2d at 1310. 
36 /d. at 851, 494 N.E.2d at 1310. 
37 Id. at 849-50, 494 N.E.2d at 1309. 
38 /d. at 850, 494 N.E.2d at 1309. See G.L. c. 119 § 391 ("Any child who is adjudicated 
a child in need of services may appeal for a trial de novo in a jury-of-six session of the 
district courts for the county where the hearing is held .... "). 
39 Parents of Two Minors, 397 Mass. at 850, 494 N.E.2d at 1309. See G.L. c. 119 § 27 
("A child, parent, guardian or person appearing in behalf of such child, or the department, 
may appeal from the adjudication of the court and from any order of commitment made as 
a result of the adjudication .... "). 
40 Parents of Two Minors, 397 Mass. at 850, 494 N.E.2d at 1309. See G.L. c. 119 §56 
("A child adjudged a delinquent child may, upon adjudication, appeal to a jury session in 
the district courts for the county where the hearing is held .... "). 
41 Parents of Two Minors, 397 Mass. at 850,494 N.E.2d at 1309. 
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Finally, the Parents of Two Minors Court examined the authority of a 
juvenile court judge to order parents to open their homes to DSS inves-
tigators. Because the legislature created juvenile courts, the Court ex-
plained, any power they have is derived from either express or implied 
grants of power by the legislature,42 or from the powers inherent in all 
courts.43 The Court observed that the legislature has not expressly 
granted juvenile courts the power to order parents to allow DSS home 
investigations.44 The Court additionally noted that, although sections 51A 
and SIB authorize the DSS to investigate anonymous allegations of child 
abuse,45 the statute is silent regarding the authority of a juvenile court 
judge to order reluctant parents to permit the investigation. 46 Moreover, 
the Court stated, power to assist the DSS is not implied in chapter 119.47 
The Parents of Two Minors Court then held that authority to order 
investigations is not an inherent power of the juvenile court. The Court 
remarked that inherent powers are restricted to powers necessary for a 
court's ability to function as a court. 48 Because juvenile courts can func-
tion as courts absent the power to give the disputed order, the Court held 
that the judge had no inherent power to authorize the DSS home inves-
tigation. 49 
In summary, the Parents of Two Minors Court held that the DSS's 
procedural arguments - that the case was moot and that direct appellate 
review was improper - were without merit. The Court further held that 
the legislature did not, either expressly or by implication, grant juvenile 
courts the power to order parents to open their homes to DSS investi-
gators, and that this power was not an inherent power. Therefore, without 
42 Id. at 851, 494 N.E.2d at 1310. See, e.g., Police Comm'r of Boston v. Municipal Ct. 
of the Dorchester District, 374 Mass. 640, 662-63, 374 N.E.2d 272, 285 (1978) ("It is a first 
principle that the jurisdictions of the several lower courts of this Commonwealth, and 
therefore their powers, are limited to those granted by the Constitution of the Common-
wealth or by the Legislature. Such grants must either be articulated expressly or be capable 
of being deduced by 'necessary and inevitable' implication.") (citations omitted). In Police 
Comm'r, the Supreme Judicial Court held that juvenile court judges are authorized to order 
the Boston police department to expunge from its records information pertaining to the 
arrest of a juvenile when a delinquency proceeding against the juvenile was dismissed with 
prejudice. Id. at 668, 374 N.E.2d at 288. Reaching this decision, the Court noted that 
although this authority was not expressly granted by the legislature, juvenile court judges 
are granted broad discretion in order to serve the best interests of the child. /d. at 666-67, 
374 N.E.2d at 287. 
43 Parents of Two Minors, 397 Mass. at 851,494 N.E.2d at 1310. 
44 ld. at 852,494 N.E.2d at 1311. 
45 ld. at 851, 494 N.E.2d at 1309. See supra notes 3-7 for relevant portions of sections 
51A and 51B. 
46 Parents of Two Minors, 397 Mass. at 851, 494 N.E.2d at 1310. 
47 /d. at 852,494 N.E.2d at 1311. 
48 Id. at 853,494 N.E.2d at 1311. 
49 ld. 
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reaching the merits of the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments, the Court 
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to relief, and quashed the order of 
the Juvenile Court. If the legislature wishes to ensure that the DSS can 
conduct investigations based on anonymous reports, therefore, it must 
expressly grant courts the authority to order reluctant parents to open 
their homes to DSS personnel. 
Parents of Two Minors demonstrates an unduly restrictive reading of 
chapter 119. Section 51B establishes a duty upon the DSS to investigate 
reports of child abuse, either within twenty four hours if the DSS has 
reason to believe the child is in immediate danger, or within ten days if 
the child is not in immediate danger. 5° In addition, the DSS investigation 
must include a horne visit, if appropriate. 51 The Parents of Two Minors 
Court has, in effect, prohibited a juvenile court from recognizing and 
enforcing these legislatively created duties. In addition, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that a court may adopt appropriate remedies 
when a legislature has created a right. 52 The ability of a court to adopt 
appropriate remedies would seem to be even greater when the legislature 
has mandated an affirmative duty, as in Parents of Two Minors, rather 
than merely created a right. Further, the Supreme Judicial Court has 
previously recognized that juvenile courts are granted broad discretionary 
powers to guard the best interests of the child.53 Thus, the Parents of 
Two Minors Court's assertion that the legislature has not implicitly 
granted courts, especially juvenile courts, the authority to order parents 
to allow DSS employees in their home is unfounded. 
In conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Parents of Two Minors, 
held that a juvenile court does not have authority to order parents to 
open their homes to DSS employees who are investigating reports of 
child abuse. In reaching this holding, the Court stated that it was exer-
cisingjudicial restraint. In effect, however, the Court refused to recognize 
a legislatively created duty imposed on the DSS. As a result, any parent 
or guardian suspected of child abuse can prevent DSS personnel from 
conducting in-horne· investigations, even though the legislature has re-
quired the DSS to conduct in-horne investigations. 
§ 4.6. Payment of Attorney Fees in Divorce Action Following Death.* In 
divorce proceedings, Massachusetts courts may award attorney's fees 
where necessary to enable a spouse to maintain or defend a divorce or 
50 G.L. c. 119 § 51B(l). See supra note 4 for text of relevant portion of section 51B. 
s• G.L. c. 119 § 51B(l). See supra note 7 for text of relevant portion of section 51B(l). 
sl J.l. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (Supreme Court held that right of private 
action exists for violation of proxy requirements of securities laws). 
sJ Police Comm'r, 374 Mass. at 666-67, 347 N.E.2d at 287. See supra, note 42 for a 
discussion of Police Comm'r. 
* William T. Matlack, staff member, Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law. 
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related action. 1 Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, section 17 
provides that during the pendency of a divorce action the court may 
require either spouse to pay an amount into court to enable the other 
spouse to maintain or defend the action. 2 The legislature enacted section 
17 in 1851, and has not significantly changed its language since. 3 
Similarly, chapter 208, section 38 empowers the judge to award legal 
costs and fees, in contrast to section 17, however, the provision has 
undergone a significant historical evolution. 4 Prior to the legislature's 
amendment in 1933, courts did not award attorney's fees under section 
38.5 Section 17 was the only provision which allowed an award of attor-
ney's fees in divorce cases. In 1933, however, the legislature expanded 
the language and scope of section 38 to include attorney's fees. 6 Unlike 
section 17, the additional language also provided that the courts' use of 
section 38 is not limited to the pendency of the action, nor is it limited 
to the period before the marriage is legally terminated.7 
During the Survey year, the Appeals Court in Edinburg v. Edinburg 
decided the novel question of whether an order pursuant to section 17 to 
pay fees for legal services already rendered by the opposing attorney can 
survive the death of the recipient spouse. 8 In Edinburg, the probate judge 
ordered the wife to reimburse her husband's lawyer for the legal services 
rendered up to that point in the proceedings.9 The husband died during 
§ 4.6. 1 See generally Goldman v. Rodriques, 370 Mass. 435, 349 
N.E.2d 335 (1976); Malcolm v. Malcolm, 257 Mass. 225, 153 N.E. 461 
(1926). 
2 Section 17 provides that "[t]he court may require either party to pay into court for the 
use of the other party during the pendency of the action an amount to enable him to 
maintain or defend the action .... " G.L. c. 208, § 17 (1984). 
3 ld. The section was amended in 1983, however, to authorize payments for health 
insurance during the pendency of the action. /d., amended by G.L. c. 208, § 17 (West 
1986). 
• G.L. c. 208 § 38 (1984). 
5 See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 273 Mass. 62, 65, 172 N.E. 914, 915 (1930). 
6 Section 38 provides that 
In any proceeding under this chapter, whether original or subsidiary, the court may, 
it its discretion, award costs and expenses, or either, to either party, whether or not 
the marital relation has terminated. In any case wherein costs and expenses, or 
either, may be awarded hereunder to a party, they may be awarded to his or her 
counsel, or may be apportioned between them. 
G.L. c. 208, § 38. 
Although the language does not explicitly mention attorney's fees, the amendment has 
been interpreted to authorize awards of fees. See, e.g., Hayden v. Hayden, 326 Mass. 587, 
594,% N.E.2d 136, 141 (1950). 
7 G.L. c. 208 § 38. See supra note 6 for text of section 38. 
8 Edinburg v. Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 192, 492 N.E.2d 1159 (1986). 
9 /d. at 195-96, 492 N.E.2d at 1162. 
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the pendency of the action, thus abating the divorce proceedings. 10 The 
Massachusetts Appeals Court held that the probate judge properly main-
tained his order for Mrs. Edinburg to pay Mr. Edinburg's attorney after 
Mr. Edinburg's death. 11 
Edinburg arose upon the filing of cross complaints for divorce in 1981. 12 
Dorothy Edinburg controlled the far greater resources of the two parties 
to the marriage. Her estimated assets were worth approximately 
$1,900,000, not including additional real estate and art works later valued 
at more than $4,500,000. 13 Joseph Edinburg, in contrast, admitted to 
assets in his name of $1,500 and a gross weekly income of $1,348.20.14 
The Edinburg's divorce proceedings were bitter and protracted. In ad-
dition to her complaint for divorce, Dorothy Edinburg filed several other 
complaints against her husband, his sister, and others relating to Mrs. 
Edinburg's continued ownership or control of substantial assetsY In-
deed, the Appeals Court characterized the parties' dissolution as a "state 
of marital war. " 16 
Dorothy Edinburg gave every indication that she would strongly resist 
any substantial subdivision of her assets with her husband, as required 
by chapter 208, section 34Y The central issue in the Edinburg's divorce 
thus became the identification, valuation, and ownership of the family 
art collection. 18 This process required extensive discovery. 19 Mrs. Edin-
burg complicated and obstructed discovery on this issue, forcing Joseph 
10 ld. at 194, 492 N.E.2d at 1161. 
11 !d. at 197, 492 N.E.2d at 1162-63. 
12 !d. at 193, 492 N .E.2d at 1160. 
13 ld. 
14 /d. at 194 n.6, 492 N.E.2d at 1161 n.6. 
15 Id. at 193, 492 N.E.2d at 1160. The cases are Edinburg v. Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. 
Ct. 199, 492 N.E.2d 1164 (1986) (Edinburg II) (concerning whether certain valuable art 
works in Dorothy Edinburg's control were gifts to her childrens' trust or remained in her 
property); Edinburg v. Cavers, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 212, 492 N.E.2d 1171 (1986) (court 
considered ownership of shares in closely held family corporation and attempted removal 
of attorney as trustee); Pinkowitz v. Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 492 N.E.2d 1153 
(1986) (involving the removal of Dorothy Edinburg from her position as executrix of her 
father's will and her removal as trustee of a trust by her children as remainder beneficiaries). 
All these cases including the divorce action were consolidated and transfered to a probate 
judge of the Middlesex Division. See Pinkowitz, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 185-86, 492 N.E.2d 
at 1156-57. 
16 Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 193,492 N.E.2d at 1160. 
17 Id. at 193, 492 N.E.2d at 1160-61. Section 34 states in part that "(u]pon divorce or 
upon a complaint in an action brought at any time after a divorce ... [the court] may make 
a judgment for either of the parties to pay alimony to the other. In addition to or in lieu of 
a judgment to pay alimony, the court may assign to either husband or wife all or any part 
of the estate of the other .... " G .L. c. 208 § 34. 
18 Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 193, 492 N.E.2d at 1161. 
19Jd. 
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Edinburg's counsel to file numerous motions and make several court 
appearances in order to compel discovery from Dorothy Edinburg on the 
ownership of these assets.20 
Joseph Edinburg was forced to liquidate all the assets held in his name 
to pay the considerable legal fees generated by the various complaints. 21 
Nonetheless, by September 30, 1982, Mr. Edinburg's obligation to his 
lawyer, Mr. Perera, for work done on the Edinburg's divorce action 
exceeded $60,000.22 Mr. Edinburg could pay only $15,000.23 By this time 
Mrs. Edinburg had paid over $75,000 to her attorneys and was continuing 
to pay approximately $2,300 a week to press her divorce and other actions 
against Mr. Edinburg.24 
On October 19, 1982, Joseph Edinburg moved pursuant to chapter 208, 
section 38 for an award of attorney's fees to make it possible for him to 
continue to prosecute and defend the divorce action. 25 The judge sug-
gested that the motion be refiled under chapter 208, section 17.26 Mr. 
Edinburg refiled the motion under section 17 and his attorney filed an 
affidavit attesting that the work he had done for Mr. Edinburg totaled 
approximately $90,000, and requesting payment of this amount from Mrs. 
Edinburg. 27 The judge held a hearing on the motion on December 29, 
1982.28 
The probate judge approved the section 17 motion, noting the financial 
circumstances of the parties and Mr. Edinburg's need for ongoing legal 
services.29 The judge ordered Mrs. Edinburg to pay $35,000 directly to 
20 Id. at 194, & n.4, 492 N.E.2d at ll6l & n.4. Mrs. Edinburg claimed that the works of 
art were no longer hers because she had given or sold them to three irrevocable trusts 
which she had established for the couple's three children. Id. at 194, 492 N.E.2d at ll6l. 
Further, much of the collection was distributed among several major Boston museums, and 
Mrs. Edinburg was uncooperative in identifying the location and extent ofthe art collection. 
ld. at 194 n.4, 492 N.E.2d at ll6l n.4. 
After the divorce proceedings were abated because of Mr. Edinburg's death, a probate 
judge found that Dorothy Edinburg had claimed that her prior sworn testimony in the 
divorce case was untrue, that she had filed false documents and that the art work that she 
had testified was the property of her children's irrevocable trusts was in fact hers. Pinkowitz 
v. Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 188-89, 492 N.E.2d at ll58. See also Edinburg II, 22 
Mass. App. Ct. at 210 & n.l, 492 N.E.2d at ll70-7l & n.l (Brown, J., concurring) (Mrs. 
Edinburg admitted committing pe!jury during numerous proceedings). 
21 Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 194 n.5, 492 N.E.2d at ll6l n.5. 
22 Id. at 194, 492 N.E.2d at ll6l. 
23 Id. 
24 ld. 
25 Id. See supra note 6 for text of section 38. 
26 ld. at 195, 492 N.E.2d at ll6l. See supra note 2 for text of section 17. 
21 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 195, 492 N.E.2d at ll6l-62. 
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Mr. Perera.30 Mrs. Edinburg was granted 30 days in which to pay attorney 
Perera's fees. 31 On January 29, 1983, however, thirty days after the 
original order, Mrs. Edinburg had not paid the attorney's fees. 32 Conse-
quently, Mr. Edinburg entered a complaint for contempt, returnable Feb-
ruary 16, 1983.33 On the returnable date Mr. Perera orally presented a 
prima facie case for contempt based on Mrs. Edinburg's failure to pay 
the fees.J4 Dorothy Edinburg's attorney did not refute Mr. Perera's ar-
guments.35 Instead, Mrs. Edinburg's attorney asked for and received a 
two day continuance.36 That evening, after the hearing, Joseph Edinburg 
diedY 
The judge heard argument on March 31, 1983 as to the effect of Mr. 
Edinburg's death on the unpaid order of attorney's fees against Mrs. 
Edinburg.38 On April6, 1983 the judge ruled that Dorothy Edinburg must 
pay as ordered. 39 The judge directed that the failure to pay Mr. Perera 
the $35,000 by April 20, 1983 would result in an automatic judgment of 
contempt against Mrs. Edinburg.40 
The Appeals Court affirmed this decision, concluding that it was within 
the discretion of the probate judge.41 The Appeals Court first noted that 
Joseph Edinburg's death abated the divorce action.42 Nonetheless, the 
appellate court found that under the particular facts of the case the order 
for payment properly could survive the abatement.43 Thus, the court held 
that an order for payment of attorney's fees under chapter 208, section 
17 may survive the death of a spouse and the abatement of the proceed-
ings.44 
The Appeals Court declined to formulate a rule for dealing with awards 
of counsel fees that are unpaid when the divorce case is dismissed or 
abated. 45 Rather, the court found several of the particular facts in the 
Edinburg's divorce case determinative. 46 First, the judge below awarded 
30 /d. at 195, 492 N .E.2d at 1162. 
31 /d. at 195-96, 492 N.E.2d at ll62. 
32 /d. at 196, 492 N.E.2d at 1162. 
33 /d. 
34Jd. 
"/d. 
36Jd. 
37 /d. 
38 /d. 
39Jd. 
40 /d. at 196-97, 492 N .E.2d at 1162. 
41 /d. at 197, 492 N.E.2d at ll62-63. 
42Jd. at 197, 492 N.E.2d at ll62. 
43 /d. at 197,492 N.E.2d at 1163. 
44 /d. at 196-97, 492 N.E.2d at ll62-63. 
45 /d. at 196, 492 N.E.2d at ll62. 
46 /d. at 197, 492 N.E.2d at ll62-63. 
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Mr. Perera attorney's fees while Mr. Edinburg was still alive.47 Second, 
Mrs. Edinburg was ordered to pay attorney Perera directly.48 Third, the 
award of fees represented an amount Mr. Edinburg owed for past ser-
vices, not future work.49 And finally, Mr. Perera had made out a clear 
and uncontradicted prima facie case of contempt against Mrs. Edinburg 
in the February 16, 1983 hearing. 50 The Appeals Court found that on 
these facts the probate judge could rule that Dorothy Edinburg must pay 
the attorney's fees resulting from her divorce action. 51 The Appeals Court 
agreed with the probate judge that the order was necessary to prevent 
Dorothy from "unjustly reaping benefit from her own delay and con-
temptuous behavior in refusing to obey the order."52 Thus, the appellate 
court found that the section 17 order to pay attorney's fees survived the 
abatement of the action. 53 
The Appeals Court affirmance in Edinburg v. Edinburg therefore rests 
on the trial judge's desire to prevent the combination of improper delay 
and unexpected death from creating an inequitable result by frustrating 
a proper order. 54 Section 17, however, authorizes payment of legal costs 
or alimony only "during the pendency of the action," and by its terms 
indicates that the amount is to be paid into court "for the use of the other 
party."55 Unstated but clear in the Edinburg decision was the court's 
approval of the initial award of attorney's fees to Joseph Edinburg. 56 
Given that the award was appropriate under the financial circumstances 
of the parties and that the award was made while Mr. Edinburg was alive 
and legally married to Mrs. Edinburg, the court concluded that sustaining 
the award after the abatement of the proceedings was within the power 
and discretion of the judgeY The Appeals Court also explicitly noted 
47 /d. 
48 /d. at 197, 492 N.E.2d at 1163. 
49 /d. 
5fJ /d. 
51 /d. 
52Jd. 
53 /d. at 197, 492 N.E.2d at 1162-63. 
54 See id. 
55 G.L. c. § 17. 
56 See Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 198, 492 N.E.2d at 1163. The Appeals Court did 
analyze the appropriateness of the size of the award, finding the $35,000 figure within the 
discretion of the judge as based on conservative principles and formulated from the ex-
amination of a detailed record of time and charges submitted by Mr. Perera. Id. The 
approval of this figure necessarily denotes the approval of the granting of the award. 
57 /d. at 197, 492 N.E.2d at 1162-63. Despite the fact that Joseph died before Dorothy 
paid, when the judge entered the award they were legally married. Compare Baird v. Baird, 
311 Mass. 329, 332-33,41 N.E.2d 5, 7 (1942) (section 17 inapplicable where divorce order 
has already been entered). 
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that section 17 provides sufficient authority for the judge to order the 
award payable directly to the attorney. 58 
It is unclear whether the court's holding in Edinburg suggests that a 
section 17 award should be enforced whenever an award of counsel fees 
is unpaid when the divorce action abates or is dismissed. The Appeals 
Court explicitly declined to make such a rule. 59 Instead, the court appears 
to have relied on the particular facts of the case; that is, the court 
apparently placed some weight on Dorothy Edinburg's behavior in this 
and the other related cases to decide the question of whether it was 
appropriate to sustain the order against her. 60 
Having implicitly determined that the facts empowered the judge to 
sustain the order after the abatement of the action, the propriety of the 
judge's decision to enforce the order rested upon Mrs. Edinburg's ac-
tions. But for her contemptuous refusal to obey the order in a timely 
fashion, Mr. Perera would have been paid before Mr. Edinburg's death. 
Both the trial and Appeals Court concluded their reasoning by noting the 
judicial frustration inherent in a contrary result, to permit a contemptuous 
party to profit from her flouting of judicial authority.61 
Chapter 208, section 17 vests in trial judges the discretionary power to 
award costs and attorney's fees to either party as needed to continue the 
action. 62 Section 17 authorizes payment of legal costs or alimony only 
"during the pendency of the action. "63 Courts have interpreted the statute 
to require that the marriage relationship still exist at the time of the 
award. 64 The Edinburg case indicates a willingness on the part of the 
courts to stretch the outer chronological limit of the power to enforce 
awards of attorney's fees under chapter 208, section 17. In so doing, the 
court breaks down some of the distiction between section 17 and section 
38 of chapter 208. 
"Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 197 n.l5, 492 N.E.2d at 1163 n.l5. 
59 Id. at 197, 492 N.E.2d at 1162. 
60 See id. at 197, 492 N.E.2d at 1162-63. Concurring in Edinburg II, Judge Brown stated 
that 
Given her blatent admission that she had falsified documents and committed petjury 
in order to deceive the trial court and her husband, I am compelled to conclude that 
she attempted to manipulate the legal system and make a mockery of our system of 
justice. Mrs. Edinburg's conduct constituted both an affront to the court's dignity 
and a perversion of the court's purposes as an institution for just resolution of 
legitimate disputes. 
Edinburg II, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 199, 210-11, 492 N.E.2d 1164, 1170-71 (1986). 
61 Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 197, 492 N.E.2d at 1163. 
62 See supra note 2 for text of section 17. The authority of the court to decree counsel 
fees or alimony has always been considered to rest exclusively upon the statute. Kelley v. 
Kelley, 161 Mass. 111, 36 N.E. 837 (1894). 
63 G.L. c. 208 § 17. 
64 See, e.g., Baird v. Baird, 311 Mass. 329, 332-33, 41 N.E.2d 5, 7 (1942). 
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This treatment may not be surprising given the historical development 
of the two sections. When the legislature amended section 38 in 1933 to 
authorize judges to award counsel fees in divorce and a wide range of 
related actions, the amendment created a redundancy within chapter 208. 
Section 17 provides that the judge may award a spouse "an amount to 
enable him to maintain or defend the action" during the proceedings. 65 
Section 38 also arms the judge with the discretion to award costs and 
expenses, including attorney's fees. 66 Section 38, however, authorizes 
such an award in any proceeding under chapter 208, regardless of whether 
the marital relationship has terminated.67 
Despite this redundancy, however, the language of the two sections 
does dovetail chronologically. Section 17 allows a judge to award legal 
costs and alimony during the suit before the final judgment. The language 
of section 38 also allows for its use during the pendency of the action, 
but its primary purpose is to allow the award of legal costs as part of 
final disposition of the divorce action, and more importantly, for any 
other related suit, such as adjustment of support after the marriage is 
terminated. 68 
Edinburg suggests, therefore, that the court is willing to limit the 
chronological distinction between the two sections, and expand the area 
of overlap. Specifically, like section 38, the enforcement of a pendente 
lite award under section 17 may now survive the abatement of the action 
and the legal termination of the marriage by death.69 
In sum, pursuant to the discretionary authority granted by section 17 
of chapter 208, a probate court ordered Dorothy Edinburg to pay $35,000 
to Joseph Edinburg's attorney during a protracted divorce proceeding. 
When Mr. Edinburg died during the course of the action, the court faced 
the issue of whether to compel payment of fees to the deceased's attorney 
even though the death abated the action which gave rise to the order of 
payment. The probate court ruled that the order survived Mr. Edinburg's 
death, reasoning that a contrary ruling would reward Mrs. Edinburg for 
her previous delay and contemptuous behavior. The Appeals Court up-
held the decision, finding that the judge could order payment of fees 
directly to the attorney, and that the abatement of the action did not 
., G.L. c. 208 § 17. 
66 G.L. c. 208 § 38. 
67 /d. 
68 See Kelley v. Kelley, 374 Mass. 826, 827, 374 N.E.2d 580, 581 (1978) (judge has 
authority to order former spouse to pay other former spouse to enable retention of counsel 
to prosecute or defend complanant for violation of of divorce decree provision); Whitney 
v. Whitney, 325 Mass. 28, 33, 88 N.E.2d 647, 652 (1949) (judge may award costs and 
expenses to petitioner upon unsuccessful appeal by former spouse from order increasing 
alimony). 
69 See Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 197, 492 N.E.2d at 1162-63. 
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prevent the judge from enforcing the order under section 17. Further, the 
Appeals Court found that under the circumstances the probate judge 
properly maintained the payment order to prevent Dorothy Edinburg 
from unjustly profiting from her refusal to obey the order. 
§ 4. 7. The Effect of a Separation Agreement Absent an Absolute Divorce 
Decree.* Massachusetts judicial opinions have traditionally maintained 
that private separation agreements could not substitute for the probate 
court's duty to structure a divorce judgment. 1 The evolving case law in 
regard to separation agreements, however, indicates an increasing rec-
ognition by the judiciary of the parties' right to determine their own 
future after the break down of the marital relationship. 2 Under Massa-
chusetts law a husband and wife contemplating divorce may enter into a 
separation agreement in order to settle their mutual rights and obliga-
tions.3 Such an agreement may provide for division of marital property, 
interspousal support, child custody and other arrangements similar to 
those which a divorce decree might order. 4 
With increasing frequency, Massachusetts courts have enforced sepa-
ration agreements which are fair, reasonable and free from fraud or 
coercion, as favorable to public policy.5 Courts have held that a separa-
tion agreement will survive entry of a judgment nisi6 if the parties so 
intend. 7 Furthermore, language in a divorce decree that the separation 
agreement shall not survive the decree does not operate to dissolve the 
agreement when the parties expressly provide that the agreement will 
remain intact regardless of the decree.8 While a probate court has broad 
discretion to construct the divorce decree, the judge has no authority to 
*Diane L. Saltoun, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.7. 1 Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 512, 432 N.E.2d 691, 693 (1982); Ryan v. 
Ryan, 371 Mass. 430, 432, 358 N.E.2d 431, 432 (1976); Freeman v. Siever, 323 Mass. 652, 
656-57, 84 N.E.2d 16, 19 (1949). 
2 See Chardak, Hobart, Miner, Leopold, Domestic Relations, 1983 ANN. SuRv. MASS. 
LAW,§ 16.1, at 481; Inker, Perocchi, Walsh, Domestic Relations, 1977 ANN. SuRv. MAss. 
LAW,§ 1.1, at 6. 
3 See Moore v. Moore, 389 Mass. 21, 24, 448 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (1983); Schillander v. 
Schillander, 307 Mass. 96, 98, 29 N.E.2d 686, 687 (1940). 
4 See generally Freedman, Marital Arrangements, BosTON BAR J. 5, 7 (September 1974). 
5 See, e.g., Moore, 389 Mass. at 24,448 N.E.2d at 1257; Surabian v. Surabian, 362 Mass. 
342, 345, 285 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1972). 
6 In Massachusetts after a divorce hearing, a divorce judgment nisi is issued. The divorce 
decree becomes absolute only after a statutorily determined waiting period of ninety days. 
The final divorce decree is then entered. G. L. c. 208, § 21 (1987). 
7 Surabian, 362 Mass. at 345, 285 N.E.2d at 911; Hills v. Shearer, 355 Mass. 405, 408, 
245 N.E.2d 253, 255 (1969); Fabrizio v. Fabrizio, 316 Mass. 343, 346, 55 N.E.2d 604, 605 
(1944). See also Freedman, supra note 4, at 10. 
8 Moore, 389 Mass. at 21-22, 448 N.E.2d at 1256. 
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modify a fair and reasonable separation agreement merely on the basis 
that it cannot be reconciled with the divorce decree.9 The resulting ten-
sion between judicial deference to private arrangements and judicial dis-
cretion to structure parties' obligations gives rise to frequent litigation 
when the divorce decree and the agreement are inconsistent. 10 
During the Survey year in Pavluvcik v. Sullivan 11 the Appeals Court 
addressed the issue whether a separation agreement made in contempla-
tion of divorce and incorporated by the probate court in the divorce 
judgment12 was contingent upon entry of the judgment nisi of divorce13 
or had full force and effect once executed by the parties. 14 Following the 
trend of Massachusetts courts to recognize the enforceability of reason-
able and equitable separation agreements, the court held that the terms 
of the agreement were binding although one spouse had died before the 
entry of the judgment nisi. 15 This question arose in Pavluvcik where a 
surviving spouse contested his obligation to distribute marital property 
under a separation agreement. 16 The wife, in Pavluvcik, died before the 
divorce was finalized, but after the probate judge had declared the mar-
riage irretrievably broken down and merged the separation agreement 
with the divorce decree. 17 
In Pavluvcik, the wife filed a complaint for divorce on July 16, 1982. 18 
On March 31, 1983 the parties executed a written separation agreement 
providing for the division of marital property, alimony and child sup-
9 /d. at 23-24, 448 N.E.2d at 1257. It is important to note that with respect to child 
support, the probate court retains broad discretion to form its own provisions regardless 
of the parents' agreement. 2 J.F. LoMBARD, FAMILY LAW,§ 1258 at 317 (1976). See Madden 
v. Madden, 359 Mass. 356, 363, 269 N.E.2d 89, 93, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); 
Buchanan v. Buchanan, 353 Mass. 351, 352, 231 N.E.2d 570, 571-72 (1967). 
10 For cases where the agreement is set up as a bar against a complaint for modification 
in the probate court, see Stansel, 385 Mass. at 515,432 N.E.2d at 695 (interspousal support); 
Surabian, 362 Mass. at 348, 285 N.E.2d at 913 (alimony); Schillander, 307 Mass. at 98-99, 
29 N.E.2d 686 (husband denied petition for modification of provisions in contract not 
incorporated in decree). 
11 22 Mass. App. Ct. 581, 495 N.E.2d 869 (1986). 
12 /d. at 582, 495 N.E.2d at 871. 
13 At the time of the hearing, G.L. c. 208 § 1A required a six month waiting period for 
entry of a judgment nisi of divorce after judicial approval of the separation agreement. /d. 
at 582-83, 495 N.E.2d 871-72. A 1985 amendment to the statute, however, reduced the 
waiting period to thirty days. G. L. c. 208, § lA (1987). 
14 Pavluvcik, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 584, 495 N.E.2d at 872. 
15 /d. at 587, 495 N.E.2d at 874. 
16 /d. at 583 n.5, 495 N.E.2d at 872 n.5. While the separation agreement contained 
provisions requiring the husband to pay child support, medical and education expenses for 
one minor child, the court was called upon to decide only issues regarding the marital 
property and the husband's rights in the wife's estate. /d. 
17 /d. at 581-82, 495 N.E.2d at 871. 
18 !d. at 582, 495 N.E.2d at 871. 
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port. 19 On that same day, a probate judge, after conducting a hearing, 
found that the marriage had irretrievably broken down.20 The judge then 
concluded that the agreement was fair and equitable,21 ordered the parties 
to comply with the agreement and incorporated and merged it with the 
judgment divorce nisi to be entered October 3, 1983, absent further action 
by the parties. 22 Unexpectedly, the wife died on May 14, 1983, several 
months before the judgment was to be entered. 23 At that time, the hus-
band and one of the three children filed a complaint seeking a declaration 
voiding the separation agreement and freeing the husband from any ob-
ligation to transfer any of the real or personal property covered by the 
agreement to the wife's estate. 24 Two other children of the marriage, one 
of whom was appointed administratrix, filed a complaint to have the 
separation agreement enforced. 25 After a hearing the probate judge found 
that although the wife had died the husband was bound by the terms of 
the agreement. 26 
On appeal the husband argued that a separation agreement, now 
merged into the divorce decree, is only effective if an absolute divorce 
is eventually grantedY Rejecting this argument, the Appeals Court, held 
that while the death of one spouse may abate divorce proceedings, 28 the 
death of one party does not necessarily terminate the effect of a sepa-
19 /d. Also included in the agreement were provisions for alimony (which were to be 
terminated at wife's death), child support, payment of education and medical expenses, 
maintenance of life insurance and division of the parties' personal property. /d. The agree-
ment required that the husband transfer an automobile to the wife within one month of the 
date of agreement and that the marital home, owned by each party as tenants by the 
entirety, be sold within two years of the agreement. /d. The proceeds from the house sale 
were to be divided 56% to the wife and 44% to the husband. /d. The husband and wife 
waived any claim to each other's estate and released each other from any past or future 
obligations. /d. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. 
22 Pavluvcik, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 582, 495 N.E.2d at 871-72. The separation agreement, 
by its terms, was to be incorporated and merged into the divorce judgment if ·granted. /d. 
at 582, 495 N.E.2d at 871. 
23 /d. at 583, 495 N.E.2d at 872. 
24 /d. 
2' /d. The probate judge consolidated the cross complaints. /d. 
26 /d. 
' 7 /d. at 583, 495 N.E.2d at 873. See Ross v. Ross, 385 Mass. 30, 35, 430 N.E.2d 815, 
819 (1982) (notwithstanding the fact that a judgment nisi is a judgment of divorce, the 
couple is not divorced until the judgment becomes absolute). See G. L. c. 208, § 21 (1985). 
28 Pavluvcik, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 583, 495 N.E.2d at 872. See Pine v. Pine, 323 Mass 
524, 525, 83 N.E.2d 171, 171 (1948) (divorce did not become effective when operation of 
divorce decree had been suspended on libelee's motion on appeal); Diggs v. Diggs, 291 
Mass. 399, 401~02, 196 N.E. 858, 860 (1935) (death of either party before entry of judgment 
nisi has become absolute ends divorce proceedings). 
45
Applebaum et al.: Chapter 4: Domestic Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1986
144 1986 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 4.7 
ration agreement. 29 The court further stated that while the husband did 
become sole record title owner of the marital real estate, he might still 
be bound by the obligation to sell the property and transfer the proceeds 
to the wife's estate, if the separation agreement is binding.30 Noting that 
Massachusetts' public policy favors agreements where parties attempt to 
settle their own financial relationship,31 the court stated that whether the 
separation agreement in this case was effective apart from the divorce 
decree required analysis of the entire agreement and its context to de-
termine the parties' intent. 32 
The Pavluvcik court looked at the context in which the agreement was 
executed,33 the actual language of the separation agreement,34 and the 
conduct of the parties involved to examine the parties' intent. 35 The court 
determined that the separation agreement was a result of a marriage 
irretrievably broken down. 36 Furthermore, the court noted the parties 
had been living apart for over two years and there was no indication that 
the couple was going to reconcile their differences. 37 Given the context 
of a lengthy separation and the breakdown of a relationship, the court 
assumed that neither party would have wanted the other to inherit the 
bulk of the marital property in the event of the death of one spouse before 
the final divorce was entered.38 Furthermore, the court noted that under 
this assumption both parties were equally exposed to the risk of untimely 
death. 39 The only suggestion that the obligations in the agreement where 
to be affected by death, the court observed, was in regard to the hus-
band's alimony payments which were to be discontinued in the event of 
the wife's death. 40 Thus, absent any basis for assuming that the parties 
would abrogate the agreement, the court found no reason for supposing 
29 Pavluvcik, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 583-84, 495 N.E.2d at 872. 
30 /d. When the disposition of property, jointly held by spouses, is at issue, some courts 
reach the same result by holding that the property has been converted to a tenancy in 
common by the provision in the separation agreement that the property be sold. I d. at 587-
88, 495 N.E.2d at 874. See Rucks v. Taylor, 282 Ark. 200, 667 S.W.2d 365 (1984); Wardlow 
v. Pozzi, 170 Cal. App. 2d 208, 338 P.2d 564 (1959); Snow v. Mathews, 190 So.2d 50 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1966). Contra In Re Violi, 165 N.Y.2d 392, 482 N.E.2d 29, 492 N.Y.S.2d 
550 (1985). 
31 Pavluvcik, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 584, 495 N.E.2d at 873. 
32 /d. at 584, 495 N.E.2d at 872. 
33 /d. at 584-86, 495 N.E.2d at 873-74. 
34 /d. at 587, 495 N.E.2d at 874. 
35 /d. at 584-85, 495 N.E.2d at 873. 
36 /d. at 584, 495 N.E.2d at 873. 
37 /d. at 584-85, 495 N.E.2d at 873. 
38 /d. at 585, 495 N.E.2d at 873. 
39 /d. 
40 /d. at 582, 495 N.E.2d at 871. 
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that it was not a final arrangement of the parties' mutual rights toward 
each other. 41 
The court found, contrary to the husband's contention, that the actual 
language of the separation agreement did not rely on entry of the judg-
ment nisi, even when the agreement had been merged with the probate 
court's divorce decree.42 Because the judge crossed out the printed words 
stating that "by agreement of the parties the separation agreement may 
also remain an independent contract" on the form used to enter the order, 
the husband contended that the agreement had no independent signifi-
cance.43 In addition, because the agreement, itself, was silent as to 
whether it had independent effectiveness,44 the court referred to past 
case law which indicated that unless otherwise stated, a separation agree-
ment is usually held to survive a subsequent divorce judgment incorpo-
rating its provisions.45 The court concluded, however, that it need not 
address this issue because the incorporation of the agreement into the 
divorce judgment merely operated to make the agreement binding on 
parties as part of the judicial decree.46 Surviving as an independent 
agreement would affect only the means of its enforcement,47 the court 
elaborated, as it could be enforced in a separate action.48 
Lastly, the husband argued that language in two clauses of the agree-
ment, that stated that the agreement would be incorporated into a divorce 
decree, indicated that the agreement was binding only upon obtaining an 
absolute judgment of divorce.49 The court, however, rejected the hus-
band's contention and found that these clauses merely reflected the par-
ties' intention to have the final divorce decree make the terms of the 
private separation agreement judicially enforceable.50 Thus, the court 
41 Id. at 585, 495 N.E.2d at 873. 
42 /d. at 587, 495 N .E.2d at 874. 
43 Id. at 586, 495 N.E.2d at 873-74. 
44 Id. at 586, 495 N.E.2d at 874. 
45 Id. See Moore, 389 Mass. at 24-25, 448 N.E.2d at 1257 (held that language in a divorce 
decree that the separation shall not survive such decree does not dissolve the agreement 
when the parties expressly provide that the agreement shall survive); Subarian, 362 Mass. 
at 345-46 n.4, 285 N.E.2d at 911 n.4 (1972) (mere fact that the separation agreement was 
incorporated in divorce decree did not mean it was terminated upon entry of the decree). 
See also Chardak, Hobart, Miner, Leopold, Domestic Relations, 1983 ANN. SuRv. MASS. 
LAW, § 16.1, at 481-88. 
46 Pavluvcik, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 586, 495 N.E.2d at 874. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 586-87, 495 N.E.2d at 874. 
49 Id. at 587, 495 N.E. 2d at 874. 
50 ld. 
The incorporation and merger of the agreement in a divorce judgment would have 
made its terms binding on the parties as part of the judgment. Only the method of 
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concluded, these clauses would not nullify the agreement if an absolute 
divorce judgment was not rendered. 51 The court noted that, in addition, 
the agreement specifically provided that its terms would be binding upon 
heirs, representatives and assigns of the parties .52 
The court then looked to the parties' conduct during the period between 
the execution of the agreement and the entry of the judgment nisi of 
divorceY The court found that the couple had partially performed their 
obligations under the separation agreement.54 Specifically, the husband 
had complied with the agreement by transferring the automobile to the 
wife and presumably had made alimony and child support payments 
beginning May 1, 1983.55 The court found these acts indicative of the 
parties' intent to have the terms of the agreement immediately binding. 56 
Absent any "countervailing equities,"57 the court held there was no 
reason why the agreement could not be the final resolution of the parties' 
mutual rights.58 The two situations which may give rise to countervailing 
equities, the court explained, are where one spouse is in danger of 
becoming a public charge because of the financial obligation to the other, 
and where there is an indication that the spouse, if alive, would have 
enforcing the terms of the agreement would have been affected by it also being an 
independent surviving agreement. 
Id. at 586-87, 495 N.E.2d at 874. 
51 ld. at 586, 495 N.E.2d at 874. While some courts refuse to enforce a separation 
agreement after the death of one spouse where language in the agreement indicates that 
the terms were only effective if the divorce was granted, the Pavluvcik court found that 
language in the agreements at issue differed significantly from the separation agreement at 
issue. Id. See Bassett v. First Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 189 Neb. 206, 210-11, 201 N.W.2d 
848, 850 (1972) (the property settlement agreeq~ent specifically provided that it was contin-
gent upon being approved and upon a divorce decree being entered); Garland v. Gilbert, 
85 Ohio App. 410, 88 N.E.2d 243 (1949) (separation agreements provided that when and if 
a divorce decree is granted, the husband is required to pay the wife $3000.00 in satisfaction 
of all claims) (emphasis in original). Compare Daywalt v. Bertrand, 10 Or. App. 418, 500 
P.2d 484 (1972) (where agreement was silent as to procedure if a spouse dies before a 
divorce decree is entered, the court held, death of one party had no effect on surviving 
spouses right to inherit). 
52 Pavluvcik, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 582, 495 N.E.2d at 871. While the Pavluvcik court 
does not comment on the binding clause in the agreement, other jurisdictions have specif-
ically found that such a clause, providing that the agreement is enforceable as to heirs, 
beneficiaries and representatives, is determinative of the parties intention to have the 
agreement extend beyond either party's death. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 381 So.2d 
1333, 1335 (Miss. 1980); Shutt v. Butner, 62 N.C. App. 701, 705, 303 S.E.2d 399,401 (1983). 
53 Pavluvcik, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 586, 495 N.E.2d at 885. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 582-83, 495 N.E.2d at 872. 
56 Id. at 585, 495 N.E.2d at 873. 
57 See Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 436-37, 358 N.E.2d 432, 435. 
58 Pavluvcik, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 585, 495 N.E.2d at 873. 
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failed to fulfill his or her part of the agreement. 59 While the court recog-
nized the probate court's discretion to find other equities as grounds for 
denying enforcement of the agreement, it found no injustices to prevent 
enforcement of the agreement.60 Thus, the court concluded that the par-
ties' right to arrange their own financial settlement in a fair and reasonable 
agreement was not contingent on a divorce decree. 61 
The Pavluvcik decision is indicative of the deference Massachusetts 
courts now will give to separation agreements. But for the separation 
agreement the wife's estate would not have benefited from any marital 
property, because, as the court noted, death abates any pending divorce 
proceedings. Although the agreement had been merged into the probate 
court's divorce decree and the judgment nisi had not been entered, the 
Pavluvcik court, nonetheless, found the agreement binding after it as-
sessed the parties' intent. This decision makes clear that in the absence 
of an express intention that the agreement's effectiveness be contingent 
upon the entry of a judgment absolute, the agreement likely will be 
enforceable on its own. Unlike other jurisdictions, the Pavluvcik court 
did not describe the agreement between the parties in contract terms.62 
The decision, however, is consistent with recent Massachusetts court 
decisions attributed to separation agreements. 63 From the Pavluvcik de-
cision it appears that a separation agreement, like a contract,64 is not 
terminable on death if performance is still possible.65 The trend is to 
exact strict compliance by the parties to the terms of the separation 
agreement, regardless of unexpected circumstances which may arise. A 
separation agreement should, thus, provide for both expected and un-
expected contingencies. After Pavluvcik, separation agreements should 
include the parties' specific intent in the event an absolute divorce decree 
is not obtained. 
The Appeals Court's opinion is consistent with the Supreme Judicial 
Court's recent view that a fair and reasonable separation agreement is a 
final settlement of the parties' affairs.66 The Pavluvcik decision held that 
a separation agreement merged with a judgment of divorce was enforce-
able even without actually obtaining an absolute divorce, if this would 
achieve more closely the parties' intent. Similarly, recent Supreme Ju-
59 Jd. (citing Randall v. Randall, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 24, 29, 455 N.E.2d 995, 999 (1983)). 
60 Pavluvcik, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 584, 495 N.E.2d at 873. 
61 Id. at 587-88, 495 N.E.2d at 874-5. 
62 See, e.g., Bruce v. Dyer, 67 Md. App. 499, 508 A.2d 510, 514 (1985); Shutt v. Butner, 
62 N.C. App. 701, 303 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1983). 
63 Moore, 389 Mass. 21, 448 N.E.2d 686 Gudge cannot modify a valid separation agree-
ment on the ground that it is inconsistent with the decree). 
64 17A C.J.S. Contracts§ 465 (1987). 
65 Pavluvcik, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 587, 495 N.E.2d at 874. 
66 See infra note 67. 
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dicial Court decisions have held that a divorce decree does not neces-
sarily interfere with the survival of a separation agreement and therefore 
such an agreement exacts strict compliance from the parties.67 The Pav-
luvcik decision thus reinforces the independent enforceablility of a sep-
aration agreement regardless of later judicial adjudication regarding the 
parties' marital status. 
Pavluvcik exemplifies the recent tendency of Massachusetts courts to 
favor private separation agreements at the expense of the deference 
traditionally awarded the probate courts to structure divorce arrange-
ments. In turn, the parties' intent at the time the separation agreement 
is executed will likely control any subsequent events or contingencies. 
The probate court should recognize that in most cases, especially when 
child support is not at issue, the separation agreement is independent 
from the divorce decree. 
§ 4.8. Cohabitation after Divorce: Not Enough to Terminate Alimony 
where Cohabitation Provision is Merged in the Judgment.* Most states, 
including Massachusetts, allow modification of an alimony award based 
on a change in the recipient or supporting spouse's circumstances after 
divorce. 1 The recipient spouse's cohabitation after divorce is one change 
in circumstances that the courts in some states find sufficient to modify 
or terminate alimony.2 Several states have statutes that specifically ter-
minate alimony merely upon post-divorce cohabitation. 3 A significant 
number of states, however, will allow judges to modify alimony only if 
there is a change in the economic circumstances of the recipient spouse.4 
One state stresses the economic circumstances of the recipient spouse 
to such an extent that even subsequent remarriage will not terminate 
67 Moore, 389 Mass. at 24, 448 N.E.2d at 1257; Randall, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 29, 455 
N.E.2d at 999. See Chardak, Hobart, Miner, L-eopold, Domestic Relations, 1983 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW, § 16.1, at 487. 
*LisaK. Snow, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 4.8. 1 See generally Basset, Changing Circumstances, Changing Agreements, 8 FAM. 
ADvoc. Winter 1986, at 29 (provides a comprehensive list of state statutes authorizing 
modification to existing alimony awards). See also G.L. c. 208, § 37 (Massachusetts statute 
allowing alimony modification). 
2 See, e.g., Sims v. Sims, 245 Ga. 680, 682, 266 S.E.2d 493, 495 (1980) (cohabitation 
alone enough to terminate alimony); In re Support of Halford, 70 Ill. App. 3d 609, 612-13, 
388 N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (1979) (same). See generally Annotation, Divorced Woman's Sub-
sequent Sexual Relations or Misconduct as Warranting, Alone or With Other Circum-
stances, Modification of Alimony Decree, 98 A.L.R.3d 453 (1980). 
3 See, e.g., ALA. CoDE § 30-2-55 (1983); GA. CoDE ANN. § 19-6-19(b) (1982); ILL. REV. 
STAT. ch. 40, para. 510(b) (1980); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 30-3-5(6) (1986). See generally Note, 
The Effect of Third Party Cohabitation on Alimony Payments, 15 TULSA L.J. 772, 780-85 
(1980) (discusses legislative response to post-divorce cohabitation). 
4 See infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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alimony automatically.5 Thus, states differ in their determination of 
whether the recipient spouse's mere cohabitation is sufficient to alter or 
terminate alimony. 
In Massachusetts, the power to grant alimony is wholly conferred by 
statute.6 The relevant statute which empowers a probate court judge to 
award alimony is chapter 208, section 34 first enacted in 1974.7 While 
section 34 provides a judge with broad discretion for making alimony 
awards, 8 Massachusetts public policy encourages parties to execute en-
forceable separation agreements that reflect the parties' intent toward 
alimony and other support and maintenance payments.9 In fact, in order 
to sue for divorce under chapter 208, section 1A, the six-month no-fault 
divorce provision, a separation agreement must be submitted to the 
court. 10 Often, the parties to a divorce set forth in the separation agree-
ment that alimony payments will terminate upon the recipient spouse's 
cohabitation. 11 Generally, a court's determination of whether or not to 
5 /n reMarriage of Schober, 379 N.W.2d 46, 47 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (construing Iowa 
rule). 
6 G.L. c. 208, § 34 (1984). See Orlandella v. Orlandella, 370 Mass. 225, 227, 347 N.E.2d 
665, 666 (1976); Parker v. Parker, 211 Mass. 139, 141, 97 N.E. 988, 989 (1912). 
7 G.L. c. 208, § 34 (1984). Section 34 specifies that alimony may be granted to either 
spouse. /d. Earlier law allowed courts to decree alimony to wives, but only a part of the 
wife's estate could be granted to the husband "in the nature of alimony." See Topor v. 
Topor, 287 Mass. 473, 474, 192 N.E. 52, 52 (1934) (interpreting G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 208, 
§ 34). Prior to 1974, the alimony statute considered only "the necessities of the recipient 
and the pecuniary resources of the giver of property in the nature of alimony, the condition 
in life of the parties, their mode of living and their conduct ... . "/d. at 475, 192 N.E. at 
53. Section 34 now requires the court to consider the following in determining the amount 
of alimony: 
the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, 
health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, em-
ployability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of 
each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court may also consider 
the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation 
in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a 
homemaker to the family unit. 
G.L. c. 208, § 34. 
A probate judge is also empowered to modify an alimony award upon petition of one of 
the parties. G.L. c. 208, § 37. The award may be modified to include anything that could 
have been ordered in the original action. /d. 
8 Bianco v. Bianco, 371 Mass. 420, 423, 358 N.E.2d 243, 245 (1976). 
9 Moore v. Moore, 389 Mass. 21, 24, 448 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (1983). 
to G.L. c. 208, § lA ("An action for divorce on the ground of an irretrievable breakdown 
of the marriage may be commenced with the filing of: ... (c) a notarized separation 
agreement.") 
11 See, e.g., Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 397 Mass. 617, 619-20, 492 N.E.2d 1133, 1135 
(1986). 
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uphold such a clause turns on whether the judgment for divorce incor-
porates or merges the parties' agreementY 
In general, if a separation agreement contains a clause which terminates 
alimony upon mere cohabitation, without change in financial circum-
stances, and this agreement survives as a contract independent of the 
judgment of divorce, courts are likely to uphold the agreement as it 
reflects the intent of the parties. 13 If a separation agreement is merged, 
and thus does not survive the judgment of divorce, then the situation is 
different. In such a case, enforcement of the terms of the agreement is 
left to the discretion of the court. 14 Many courts, however, find it beyond 
a judge's discretion to alter alimony based solely upon cohabitation after 
divorce because in their view, a party's financial circumstances after 
divorce, and not his or her conduct, should affect the alimony award. 15 
Prior to the Survey year, the leading case in Massachusetts on the 
enforceability of cohabitation clauses in separation agreements was the 
12 See id. at 624 n.8, 492 N.E.2d at l138 n.8. This chapter deals primarily with no-fault 
divorces sought under G.L. c. 208, § 1A (1984). Under section 1A, parties must submit a 
separation agreement that will be either simply incorporated or incorporatt;:d and merged 
in the divorce decree. G.L. c. 208, § lA. An incorporated separation agreement has the 
full force and effect of a court order. I d. If the agreement is incorporated and merged into 
the decree it no longer survives as an independent agreement. See J. LOMBARD, FAMILY 
LAW, 2 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 1263, at 338 (1967). Because the agreement is no longer 
separate from the court order, it can be enforced only by the contempt power of the probate 
judge. Gottsegen, 397 Mass. at 624 n.8, 492 N.E.2d at l138 n.8. Section 1A also provides 
that the separation agreement can be incorporated and still survive as an independent 
contract if the parties choose this option. G.L. c. 208, § 1A. If the agreement is incorporated 
but not merged, the separation agreement would be enforceable in a contract action. See 
LOMBARD, supra, § 1252, at 73. Whether a separation agreement is incorporated, or both 
incorporated and merged, the probate judge under section 1A has the power to modify the 
agreement upon petition of one of the parties if there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances. G.L. c. 208, § 1A. See generally LoMBARD, supra, §§ 1251-75 (discussion 
of the effects of incorporation and/or merger on the enforceability of separation agree-
ments). 
If a divorce is not filed under section 1A, so that incorporation of a separation agreement 
is not required, it is possible for the parties to execute an independent separation agreement 
enforceable under the principles of contract law. See id. § 1263, at 340. The judge, however, 
may ignore this non-incorporated agreement and make his own alimony award. Id. § 1263, 
at 336-37. 
13 See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 393 Mass. 20, 23-24, 468 N.E.2d 859, 861 (1984), cert. denied, 
470 U.S. 1027 (1985); Bisig v. Bisig, 124 N.H. 372, 376, 469 A.2d 1348, 1350 (1983) (dictum). 
14 Gottsegen, 397 Mass. at 624 n.8, 492 N.E.2d at 1138 n.8. See also LOMBARD, supra 
note 12, § 1263, at 338. 
15 E.g., In re Marriage of Schober, 379 N.W.2d at 47; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 
1140, l143 (Me. 1980); Petish v. Petish, 144 Mich. App. 319, 322, 375 N.W.2d 432, 434 
(1985); Bisig, 124 N.H. at 376, 469 A.2d at 1350; Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 154, 456 
A.2d 102, 104 (1983); Overson v. Overson, 125 Wis. 2d 13, 17-18, 370 N.W.2d 7%, 798 
(Ct. App. 1985). 
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1984 Supreme Judicial Court decision of Bell v. Bell. 16 In Bell, a coha-
bitation clause terminated the recipient spouse's alimony independent of 
a change in financial circumstances. 17 The Appeals Court had determined 
that the Bells' cohabitation clause could not be interpreted to mean 
termination upon mere cohabitation. 18 Rather, the Appeals Court main-
tained that the clause was designed to terminate alimony if the wife 
received "significant actual support" from the man with whom she co-
habited.19 Because Mrs. Bell was not receiving significant actual support 
from the man with whom she cohabited, the Appeals Court determined 
that her alimony should not be terminated. 20 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Bell appellate decision. 21 In 
Its decision, the Bell Court concluded that the Appeals Court misread 
the language of the Bells' agreement. 22 Because the language of the Bells' 
agreement did not mention specifically that the wife must receive signif-
icant outside support from her cohabitant before alimony ceased, the 
Court allowed the termination of alimony. 23 The Court concluded that 
termination of alimony was appropriate because this result was the clear 
intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the separation 
agreement. 24 
During the Survey year, in Gottsegen v. Gottsegen,25 the Supreme 
Judicial Court again examined the enforceability of a separation agree-
ment that terminates alimony merely upon the recipient spouse's post-
divorce cohabitation. The Court held that where a challenged separation 
agreement clause has been merged with the judgment of divorce, a pro-
bate judge may not order the termination of alimony based solely upon 
the conduct of the recipient spouse. 26 The Court stressed that the purpose 
of alimony is to provide economic support for the recipient spouse. 27 
Thus, the Court concluded that cohabitation may not operate to terminate 
alimony if the cohabitation is unrelated to the recipient spouse's need for 
alimony or the supporting spouse's ability to pay.28 
In Gottsegen, Mrs. Gottsegen sued for divorce in 1980 on the grounds 
16 393 Mass. 20, 468 N.E.2d 859 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985). 
17 Jd. at 21, 468 N.E.2d at 860. 
18 Bell v. Bell, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 188, 194, 459 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1983). 
19 ld. 
20 Jd. at 195, 459 N.E.2d at 113. 
21 Bell, 393 Mass. at 20, 468 N.E.2d at 860. 
22 See id. at 23, 468 N.E.2d at 861. 
23 Id. 
24 ld. 
25 397 Mass. 617, 492 N.E.2d 1133 (1986). 
26 /d. at 618, 625, 492 N .E.2d at 1134, 1138-39. 
27 Id. at 623-24, 492 N.E.2d at 1137-38. 
28 See id. at 625, 492 N.E.2d at 1138-39. 
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of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage pursuant to chapter 208, sec-
tion 1A. 29 Before the divorce, the parties executed a separation agree-
ment, as required by section 1A,30 that they agreed to incorporate into 
the divorce decree. 31 Further, the parties agreed that the provisions in 
Article IIP2 of the agreement concerning Mrs. Gottsegen's "financial 
arrangements" would be merged in the judgment although the remaining 
provisions of the agreement would stand as an independent contract. 33 
As the parties intended, the separation agreement was incorporated and 
Article III was merged in the judgment of divorce nisi on August 3, 
1981,34 
Article III made provisions for the payment of alimony to Mrs. Gott-
segen. Article III provided that Mr. Gottsegen would pay Mrs. Gottsegen 
$812.50 per month for her support and maintenance as long as she did 
not remarry within five years of the execution date of the agreement. 35 
If she remarried, Mr. Gottsegen 's support payments would terminate and 
be substituted by an obligation to pay $30,000 to his former wife in 
monthly installments of $833.33 over three years. 36 Article III, however, 
defined remarriage of the wife to include "cohabitation with the same 
unrelated man with whom the wife has a romantic relationship for more 
than two (2) consecutive months. "37 
In 1983, Mr. Gottsegen terminated his support payments and com-
menced paying installments on the $30,000 obligation after confirming 
that his former wife was cohabiting with a man with whom she was 
involved romantically. 38 Mrs. Gottsegen responded to the altered alimony 
payments by filing a complaint for civil contempt of the divorce judg-
ment. 39 Mr. Gottsegen counterclaimed that his former wife had caused 
the termination of alimony payments by remarrying, as defined by the 
29 I d. at 618, 492 N .E.2d at 1134. It is relevant that Mrs. Gottsegen filed for divorce 
under section 1A. Under section 1A, the parties must submit a separation agreement for 
court approval. G.L. c. 208, § 1A. If the court does not approve the agreement, it is null 
and void between the parties. ld. In general, filing under section 1A is desirable because a 
divorce nisi can be obtained in six months. Id. Under other divorce statutes, it takes at 
least one year to obtain a divorce. See, e.g., G.L. c. 208, § 1B (1984). 
30 G.L. c. 208, § 1A. 
31 Gottsegen, 397 Mass. at 619, 492 N.E.2d at 1135. 
32 Article III of the separation agreement was titled: "Financial Arrangements Relating 
to Wife." I d. (quoting Art. III of Gottsegen separation agreement). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 ld. 
36 ld. 
37 Id. at 620, 492 N.E.2d at 1135. 
3s Id. 
39 ld. 
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terms of the separation agreement, within five years of the date of ex-
ecution of the agreement. 40 
The probate judge determined that Mrs. Gottsegen had engaged in a 
romantic relationship and that she had cohabited with a man for more 
than two consecutive months;41 the judge concluded, therefore, that her 
alimony should terminate according to the terms of Article III of the 
separation agreement. 42 The judge reached this conclusion even though 
he made detailed findings of fact that Mrs. Gottsegen had a continuing 
financial need for alimony. 43 Accordingly, the probate judge concluded 
that Mr. Gottsegen was not in contempt and that the remarriage clause 
-terminating Mrs. Gottsegen's alimony upon two month's cohabitation 
- should be given effect.44 Mrs. Gottsegen appealed this decision.45 
The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the appeal of the probate 
court's decision on its own initiative. 46 The Gottsegen Court held that a 
probate court may not order the termination of alimony absent a change 
in the economic circumstances of either of the parties.47 The majority in 
Gottsegen concluded that where the challenged provision in a separation 
agreement no longer stands on its own because it has been merged with 
the divorce decree, a judge does not have the discretion to order the 
termination of support payments based solely upon the recipient spouse's 
cohabitation.48 Consequently, the Court vacated and remanded the pro-
bate court's ruling on civil contempt.49 The Court found that the judge 
did not have the discretion to allow Mr. Gottsegen to terminate alimony 
40 /d. 
41 /d. at 620-21, 492 N.E.2d at 1135-36. The parties stipulated that Mrs. Gottsegen had 
a romantic relationship with one L.W. /d. at 620, 492 N.E.2d at 1135. 
42 /d. at 620-21, 492 N.E.2d at 1136. 
43 /d. at 620,492 N.E.2d at 1136. The probate judge's findings included: 
/d. 
40. [L.W.) and Mrs. Gottsegen have never represented to be man and wife, even on 
over night trips. 41. Mrs. Gottsegen receives no financial support from Mr. [L.W.) 
except [that] he pays for about 85% of the cost of eating out. Mrs. Gottsegen provided 
no financial support to [L. W.) 42. Mrs. Gottsegen and [L. W.) have no joint assets 
of any kind. 43. Mrs. Gottsegen and [L. W.) maintain separate residences. 44. There 
is a continuing need for alimony for Mrs. Gottsegen. 
44 /d. at 620-21, 492 N.E.2d at 1136. In addition to her civil contempt claim, Mrs. 
Gottsegen also moved for relief from the judgment of divorce under MAss. R. DoM. REL. 
P. 60 (b) (1975). /d. at 618, 492 N.E.2d at 1135. This motion was dismissed as untimely. 
ld. at 628, 492 N.E.2d at 1140. 
45 /d. at 618-19, 492 N .E.2d at 1135. 
46 /d. at 619,492 N.E.2d at 1135. 
47 /d. at 618, 492 N .E.2d at 1134. 
48 /d. at 625, 492 N.E.2d at 1139. 
49 /d. at 619,492 N.E.2d at 1135. 
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because the findings of fact clearly indicated that Mrs. Gottsegen' s finan-
cial circumstances had not materially changed. 50 
The Court reached this result by examining its powers to grant ali-
mony.51 The historical purpose of alimony, the Court explained, was to 
provide economic support fot wives who traditionally were dependent 
on their husbands. 52 The Court noted that although the decision to award 
alimony is generally within the discretion of the judge,53 the judge's 
discretion must conform to the provisions of chapter 208, section 34.54 
The Court explained that the fundamental purpose of alimony under 
section 34 is consistent with the historical analysis; economic support of 
the recipient spouse is still the essential element.55 Given the statutory 
purpose, and the limits in section 34 on a judge's discretion to award 
alimony, the Court mandated that "the Probate Court may not in the 
original divorce judgment order alimony to be terminated on mere co-
habitation. "56 The Court concluded that the probate judge has no au-
thority to allow a divorced spouse to exercise control over a former 
spouse's life by terminating alimony for moral, rather than economic, 
reasonsY The Gottsegen Court thus overturned the probate court be-
cause it had ordered Mrs. Gottsegen's alimony terminated solely because 
she was cohabiting after the divorce. 58 
The majority opinion in Gottsegen, and the even more emphatic con-
currence of Chief Justice Hennessey, stated that the decision in Gottse-
gen did not overrule the Court's decision in Bell. 59 Bell is distinguishable, 
the Court explained, because the disputed cohabitation clause in Bell 
existed as an independent clause in a contract after the judgment of 
divorce. 60 Because the Bell clause existed independently, the Court stated 
50 /d. at 626, 492 N.E.2d at 1139. 
51 /d. at 621-24, 492 N .E.2d at 1136-38. 
52 /d. at 622, 492 N.E.2d at 1137. 
53 See id. at 623, 492 N.E.2d at 1137. 
54 /d. 
55 /d. at 623-24, 492 N.~.2d at ll37. 
56 /d. at 625, 492 N:E.2d at 1138. The Court noted that a party's conduct after divorce 
is not relevant in examining an alimony award. Id. at 625 n.10, 492 N.E.2d at 1139 n.10. 
See infra notes 76-86 for discussion of whether this statement coupled with a footnote to 
the statement precludes future separation agreements from containing mere cohabitation 
clauses. 
57 See Gottsegen, 397 Mass at 624-25, 492 N.E.2d at 1138. 
58 See id. at 626, 492 N.E.2d at 1139. 
59 See id. at 624 n.8, 492 N.E.2d at 1138 n.8 (majority); id. at 629, 492 N.E.2d at 1141 
(Hennessey, C.J., concurring) ("I wish to emphasize that this case does not overrule the 
principles of Bell v. Bell .... "). 
60 Id. at 624 n.8, 492 N.E.2d at 1138 n.8.; see also id. at 629, 492 N.E.2d at ll41 
(Hennessey, C.J., concurring). 
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that it was enforceable according to the intent of the parties. 61 In Gott-
segen, however, the fact that the cohabitation clause was merged, left 
enforcement to the discretion of the judge;62 the intent of the parties was 
no longer important. 63 The Court concluded that it was beyond the scope 
of the judge's discretion to alter alimony based on the moral conduct of 
the parties after divorce.64 Accordingly, a judge may not alter alimony 
based on a merged mere cohabitation clause even if the initial agreement 
reflected this intention. 65 
The altered financial circumstances analysis by which the Court 
reached its conclusion was accepted in principle by the dissent of Justice 
Nolan. 66 He maintained, however, that this analysis was not appropriate 
to this case.67 Even though he accepted that ajudge may not terminate 
alimony based on post-divorce moral conduct, Justice Nolan explained 
that the parties, through a separation agreement, can agree to terminate 
alimony upon mere post-divorce cohabitation.68 Justice Nolan stated that 
the decision in Gottsegen contradicts the Court's holding in Bell because 
the majority ignored the intent of the parties.69 Because Gottsegen and 
Bell are so similar, ,he maintained, distinguishing the cases based on the 
merger or non-merger of the cohabitation clause elevates form over 
substance.70 By ignoring the intent of the parties, Justice Nolan stated 
that Gottsegen "has irredeemingly overruled Bell without forthrightly 
admitting it. '·'71 
The effect of Gottsegen on existing divorce settlements in the Com-
monwealth rests on whether or not the cohabitation <:;lause involved is 
merged with the judgment of divorce. 72 If the parties in a divorce have 
merged the disputed clause, it is unlikely that a probate judge will now 
enforce the clause absent a change in financial circumstances of the 
recipient spouse. 73 A court likely will reach this result even though the 
61 /d. at 624 n.8, 492 N .E.2d at 1138 n.8. 
62Jd. 
63fd. 
64 /d. at 624-25, 492 N.E.2d at 1138-39. 
65 /d. at 624 n.8, 492 N.E.2d at 1138 n.8. 
66 /d. at 630, 492 N.E.2d 1141 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
67 /d. 
68 See id. 
69 /d. at 631, 492 N.E.2d at 1142 (Nolan, J., dissenting). 
70 /d. at 630, 492 N.E.2d at 1141 (Nolan, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that the 
majority Justices in the Gottsegen decision (Justices Abrams, Wilkins, Liacos) each dis-
sented in Bell. Likewise, the dissenter in Gottsegen, Justice Nolan, was part of the majority 
in Bell. 
71 /d. 
72 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
73 Gottsegen, 397 Mass. at 624, 492 N .E.2d at 1138. 
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parties originally intended for the provision to be enforced. 74 If an existing 
cohabitation clause remains an independent contract, because the parties 
chose not to merge the clause with the divorce decree, Gottsegen, by 
explicitly upholding Bell, suggests that a court will uphold a cohabitation 
clause.75 
The practical effect of Gottsegen on a separation agreement made after 
this decision is less certain. Obviously, parties who intend mere cohabi-
tation to terminate alimony will refuse to merge a cohabitation provision 
with the judgment in the hope that Bell will apply to their agreement.76 
The Court suggests in a footnote, however, that probate judges may 
ignore the intent of the parties by not allowing incorporation of separation 
agreements into divorce decrees if the agreement contains a mere coha-
bitation clause. 77 The Court stated that the probate court should not 
accept clauses like the one in Gottsegen because approval of the resulting 
order would be beyond the judge's discretion. 78 The Court noted that the 
probate court may allow the parties to renegotiate or may incorporate 
some or all of the allowable portion of the agreement. 79 It is unclear 
whether the Court intends, with this footnote, to render all future mere 
cohabitation clauses invalid, thus implicitly overruling Bell, or whether 
it refers only to future clauses that will not survive the judgment of 
divorce. 
Under the provisions of chapter 208, section lA, the parties must 
74 Id. at 624 n.8, 492 N.E.2d at 1138 n.8. 
15 ld. 
76 See id. 
77 Id. at 625 n.9, 492 N.E.2d at 1138 n.9. The sentence that introduces this footnote 
reads: "Thus, the Probate Court may not in the original divorce judgment order alimony 
to be terminated on mere cohabitation." ld. at 625,492 N.E.2d at 1138. The footnote states: 
If the parties submit such a clause to the court for incorporation in the judgment, as 
was done in this case, the court should inform the parties that such an order is 
beyond the scope of its discretion. The court may then allow the parties an oppor-
tunity to renegotiate a proposed order to present to the court, or may incorporate 
in the judgment some or all of the allowable portion of the agreement. Nothing in 
today's decision, however, disturbs our holding in Moore v. Moore, that the Probate 
Court may not order that a separation agreement shall not survive when the parties 
clearly intended that it should. 
397 Mass at 625 n.9, 492 N.E.2d at 1138 n.9 (citations omitted). Moore v. Moore stands 
for the proposition that a probate judge may modify a decree, or refuse to incorporate the 
separation agreement into the decree, but it may not modify the agreement by saying that 
it shall not survive the decree when the parties clearly intend for the agreement to survive 
independently. Moore, 389 Mass. 21, 24,448 N.E.2d 1255, 1257. See also Leopold, Divorce 
Decrees-Survival of Separation Agreements, 1983 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW,§ 16.1, at 481-
88. 
78 Gottsegen, 397 Mass. at 625 n.9, 492 N.E.2d at 1138 n.9. 
19 ld. The relevant language is set out in note 72 above. This language is consistent with 
the discretionary authority of the probate court. See G.L. c. 208, § lA. 
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submit a separation agreement for incorporation to the probate judge. 80 
Before a separation agreement is incorporated, it must be approved by 
the judge. 81 Before a judge approves a separation agreement, he or she 
must find the terms "fair" and "reasonable" in accordance with the Su-
preme Judicial Court's 1976 decision of Knox v. Remick.82 Combining 
the Knox message with the clear message from Gottsegen, that the sup-
porting spouse cannot regulate the private life of his or her spouse after 
divorce,83 a probate judge may find cohabitation clauses unfair and un-
reasonable. Therefore, the judge may refuse to incorporate an anti-eo-
habitation clause into a divorce decree whether or not the clause will 
stand independently after divorce.84 Because a probate judge can inter-
pret the language in Gottsegen as disallowing any incorporation of co-
habitation clauses, the Court arguably has overruled Bell. 
Thus, while Gottsegen explicitly does not overrule Bell, implicitly 
Gottsegen seems to give a judge the discretion to disregard the intent of 
the parties and refuse to incorporate a separation agreement with a mere 
cohabitation clause into a decree. 85 Because section 1A requires the 
parties to submit a separation agreement to the judge, Gottsegen may 
effectively foreclose this divorce statute to parties who want a cohabi-
tation clause in a separation agreement.86 Therefore, parties may be 
80 G.L. c. 208, § 1A. See also supra note 10 and 12. 
81 G.L. c. 208, § 1A. 
82 371 Mass. 433, 436-37, 358 N.E.2d 432, 435-36 (1976). The Knox Court explains: 
/d. 
If a judge rules, either at the time of the entry of a judgment nisi of divorce or at 
any subsequent time, that the agreement was not the product of fraud or coercion, 
that it was fair and reasonable at the time of entry of the judgment nisi, and that the 
parties clearly agreed on the finality of the agreement on the subject of interspousal 
support, the agreement concerning interspousal support should be specifically en-
forced, absent countervailing equities. This has been the result indicated by this 
court, [Supreme Judicial Court], numerous times in the past. 
83 Gottsegen, 397 Mass. at 624, 492 N.E.2d at 1138. 
84 The Bell appellate decision, see supra text accompanying notes 18-20, indicates that 
at least some courts in the Commonwealth are willing to ignore the plain language of a 
separation agreement and refuse to uphold a mere cohabitation clause. See Bell, 16 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 194, 459 N.E.2d at 112. The Bell appellate court found that only cohabitation 
accompanied with a financial change could trigger the clause even though the clause did 
not say this. Id. Even though this opinion was reversed by the Supreme Judicial Court, it 
was only done so over three strong dissents (the Gottsegen majority). Bell, 393 Mass. at 
24-27, 468 N.E.2d at 862-63 (Wilkins, J., Liacos, J., Abrams, J., dissenting). The Appeals 
Court's predilection for equitable enforcement of the cohabitation clauses may resurface 
given the Court's decision in Gottsegen. 
8' See Gottsegen, 397 Mass. at 625 n.99, 492 N.E.2d at 1138 n.9. 
86 See supra note 12. If the judge under section 1A finds a provision in a separation 
agreement unfair or unreasonable, the judge may refuse to incorporate the agreement unless 
the parties modify the challenged portion. G.L. c. 208, § lA. If the parties do not change 
the agreement, the divorce action will be dismissed. ld. 
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forced to balance the benefits of obtaining a quick divorce with the burden 
of not including a cohabitation clause in the separation agreement. 
In summary, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 
held that in cases where a separation agreement clause that terminates 
alimony upon the recipient spouse's cohabitation is merged into the 
judgment of divorce, it is beyond the discretion of the probate court to 
enforce such a provision. The Gottsegen Court maintains that this deci-
sion upholds its decision in Bell because Gottsegen does not apply if the 
disputed clause is not merged with the decree. The practical effect of 
Gottsegen is that mere cohabitation clauses that are· currently merged 
with a judgment of divorce are no longer enforceable absent a change in 
financial circumstances accompanying the cohabitation. If the clause is 
simply incorporated into the judgment so that it has survived the judg-
ment, the clause will most likely be upheld. The language in Gottsegen, 
however, is sufficiently ambiguous to permit a probate judge to reason~ 
ably interpret Gottsegen to give him or her the discretion to reject alto-
gether the incorporation of cohabitation clauses that terminate alimony 
with<,mt a change in financial circumstances. Thus, Gottsegen may signal 
that a change in Massachusetts probate law is coming in which cohabi-
tation after divorce without a corresponding change in financial circum-
stances is no longer a valid reason to terminate alimony even if the 
parties intend termination. 
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